

THE PARADOXES OF DEMOCRACY

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Abstract

The paper on the paradoxes of democracy addresses the inversions and contradictions of democratic norms and democratic reality. The main issues examined in the paper are the autonomy of political will, aporia of democratic majority, immunisation of democracy, polarisation of freedom and equality, crisis of representation, inversion of content and procedure, and the political determinants of democracy. The empirical and political reality of democracy is in opposition to the original meaning of democracy as a norm and value.

Key words: democracy, paradox, participation, voting will, majority vote, immunisation of democracy, politics.

ПАРАДОКСИ ДЕМОКРАТИЈЕ

Апстракт

У овом раду о парадоксима демократије истражују се инверзије и противречности демократске норме и демократске стварности. Посебно се проблематизује аутономија политичке воље, апорије демократске већине, имунизација демократије, поларизације слободе и једнакости, криза репрезентације, инверзија садржине и процедуре, и политичке одреднице демократије. Емпиријска политичка реалност демократије супротна је самом значењу демократије као норме и вредности.

Кључне речи: демократија, парадокс, партиципација, изборна воља, изборна већина, имунизација демократије, политика.

INTRODUCTION

The paradox of democracy indicates the opinions, beliefs, behaviours, actions, and practices that are contrary to the real meaning of democracy. Moreover, it points to the sharpened polarization between democratic theory, doctrine, norm, and the empirical behaviour of political actors. The fundamental idea underlying the paper is the contradiction be-

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tween the normative and prescriptive side of democracy: what it should be and what it actually is. The divergence and alienation of normative and factual democracy translates democracy into its opposite. The implied and necessary discrepancy between the norm and the reality of democracy has long since exceeded the permissible boundaries and limits. From the empirical point of view, democracy is operationally and empirically practiced as the rule of an elected minority that should rule in the interest of the majority, guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of minorities (not only ethnic, but also minorities in political, ideological and majority terms as opposition, minority groups). It is already clear that direct democracy is not possible in modern conditions, but it is clear that indirect democracy is increasingly losing its meaning because the elected minority often rules more and more in the interest of the minority and not the majority. Democracy is not a perfect political and social creation. It has its historical forms and metamorphoses, challenges and opposites. No political system has yet implemented democratic ideals and norms, but has only more or less operationalised them as a result of historical processes. Ideals are never achieved to the point of the identity of the norm and reality, but an awareness of the minimum democratic standards of sustainable democracy must always exist.

The realistic thesis of democracy comes down to the rule of an elected minority that rules in the interest of the minority, that is increasingly alienated from the will of the people, whereby it manipulatively shapes the electoral will, imposes choice and cares more about the interests of powerful political, economic and financial groups internally, rather than the interests and needs of citizens. Democracy today is reduced to popular acclamation and confirmation by the elite of an already imposed decision that is offered in a political campaign as an autonomous will, i.e. an autonomous interest and need of citizens. Thus, an electoral democratic decision is a quasi-decision, i.e. it is an uncritical reception and confirmation of an already determined and authorised policy and election.

Modern methods of manipulation, propaganda and spinning have advanced so much that the average citizen-voter is no longer rationally aware of whom he or she is giving the vote to in the elections. Today, one can speak of controlled and managed democracy as opposite to autonomous and freely expressed political will.

Although almost everyone swears by democracy and swears on it, the prevailing opinion is that multi-party parliamentary elections do not necessarily lead to the democratization of political life, but often represent only a democratic screen for a polyarchy in which a small group governs the state through strict control of the electoral process. (Vuletić, 2012: 9)

Anthony Giddens' view on the paradox of democracy is inspiring. It evidences that, on the one hand, we have the spread of democracy

throughout the world, and on the other hand, in societies with a significant democratic tradition, there is a great disappointment in democratic processes, i.e. the indifference or disappointment with the political system (Giddens, 2005: 95). Namely, belief in democracy, its values, ideas, its comparative advantage over autocratic methods of governing, on the one hand, and the decline in trust in the work of political institutions and the actions of institutional role holders and political authorities are widespread. Thus, the gap between normative democratism and political realism can be seen in the gap between faith in democracy as an order, and dissatisfaction with its functioning and its effectiveness. At an experiential level, the crisis of democracy is increasingly viewed, according to Giddens, in distrust of democratically elected elites who play institutional roles. Inefficient state, “lazy” and unprofessional administration and bureaucratic arbitrariness do not contribute to the implementation of the rights of individuals and groups. If the conditions in which there is no functional, independent and autonomous judicial system are taken into account as well, then the space for exercising rights is even narrower. Thus, dysfunctional democracy implies problems in the functionality of law because effective law is an indicator of the democratic character of the state and society.

However, the paradoxes and contradictions of democracy should be further problematised from several points of view, which at the same time represents an attempt to consider the democratic paradox more comprehensively: from the view of processes, actors, and abuse of political and election law.

THE STANCE ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The primary figure of civil society is the citizen, who, by acting together with other people, achieves his or her primary function by effectively influencing political power and the centers of political decision-making. Civil society, politically organised, represents the active potential of society as a whole. “If there is a political revolution going on all over the world, that revolution could be called an explosion of participation” (Almond and Verba, 2000, p. 14.). With a participatory revolution, politics becomes a mass phenomenon with a multitude of subjects, actors, organizations. By means of the participatory revolution, politics became a mass phenomenon with a multitude of subjects, actors, organizations. Universal suffrage, the entry of the masses into politics, freedom of political and social action have all contributed to the affirmation and importance of political participation. Political inclusion is an important determinant of a modern democratic society. Unlike earlier epochs in which political rights and freedoms were preserved for a minority (the example

of the Antiquity and the Middle Ages), today not only are people involved in politics in so many ways, but the whole society is politicised.

However, the importance of citizen participation today is increasingly declining in quality. This brings us to another paradox of democracy: civic participation is increasingly becoming an empty form without content. This suggests an inverse proportionality, therefore, the greater the participatory inclusion of citizens in the political and electoral process, the less the actual effective influence of citizens. The condition without which democracy could not exist is extremely marginalised. Civil society, which should be influential, controllable and open, is increasingly becoming managed, shaped, manipulated, marginalised; society has become an object of political rule, a society in which “a large number of citizens are reduced to the role of manipulated, passive, inert participants” (Krauč, 2014, : 36). Instead of civil society acting on political power, political power effectively shapes the attitudes and opinions of society. Instead of the citizens and the public controlling the elected political government, something opposite happens. Namely, the elected government controls the political society by instilling attitudes, opinions and behaviours that are in the direct function of the uncritical support for that same government. In this way, the articulation and aggregation of interests and needs is controlled, channeled, limited or prevented. Also, regarding the protest and critical potential of the society and the populist outpouring, it can be said that they are strictly controlled, dosed, limited, amortised. Since politics is mainly promoted, represented through the media and since they are under the strict control of the government, their function is to control thoughts and behaviours of recipients who watch, listen, agree but generally do not understand the real meaning of the media message. Thus, the basic strategy of governance and control of society is the manipulation of information, concepts, actors, programmes, processes, exploitation and mobilization of emotions and needs of people.

THE STANCE ON THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY

Instead of fulfilling the will of the majority, democratic rule is used for the purpose of promoting the interests of the minority. This inversion of the political topos of democracy (the will of the people and the government) leads to the fact that the will of the people, manipulatively shaped, is not a freewill per se. This way, representative institutions no longer represent the interests of the people, but the partial interests of special groups, lobby groups and “power brokers.”

It follows that democracy often generates both the powerlessness of the majority and the powerlessness of the minority. If the democratic majority is diffuse, structural, passive, uncritical, without a real possibility of influencing the government, shaped and manipulated, it really rep-

resents a powerless majority that does not have the strength and potential to influence the politics and law of the state. As much as the majority can be powerless in relation to the ruling minority, which certainly sounds paradoxical, so much, on the other hand, minorities can be weak, disenfranchised and powerless, including the individual. Only the ruling minority is powerful.

The powerlessness of a minority can be seen as the “tyranny of the majority” or the autocracy of an elected minority that does not provide protective mechanisms for the rights of minorities, not only political and ideological minorities, but also minorities in ethnic, economic and other terms. Thus, behind the presented majority will is an authoritarian and totalitarian government that abuses its legitimacy by generalizing the obtained support to the entire society and imposing partial interests as the interests of society.

THE STANCE ON DEMOCRACY IMMUNISATION

The paradox of democracy is expressed in the (im)possibility or necessity of the immunization of democracy in relation to other and opposite political forms and contents, i.e. its vulnerability in relation to autocratic influences. We can call this the autocratic elitism of democracy. Its permeability to autocratic, elitist and economically profitable influences undermines its elementary foundations. Regardless of the fact that today there are no pure political forms and regardless of the fact that today's political systems are of a mixed character in the ideological and formative and political sense, the tendencies of frequent and prevalent autocratization, corruption and plutocracy of democracy undermine its fundamental essence. Antidemocratic processes are increasingly becoming an accompanying, almost constant content of the formal democratic procedure. Democracy is increasingly losing its identity in the invasion and flourishing of different political identities and interests. Its persistence depends on how capable it is of reproducing itself and remaining an independent entity in relation to the different political forms and contents that support and regress it.

A special paradox of democracy can be interpreted as the possibility of self-abolition, because world's history has repeatedly seen states “from the harshest internal dictatorships, to aggression in international relations” (Markovic, 1993: 141). Even today, the problem of immunising democracy from content that weakens its potential is visible. Distinct oligarchization of social and political life, authoritarian tendencies, lack of representation of interests - these are just some of the key factors that deepen a certain crisis and dissolution of democracy.

Democracy is like a discreet creator who makes its discreet premises available to anyone interested, without asking where he or she comes from, or where he or she is going, or what his or her intentions are. (Marković, 1993: 117)

Every political form contains a certain contradiction or negation, even a democratic one. Democracy also has the inherent property of self-abolition, negation, the germ of pathology, the evident processes of corruption and perversion of politics and democracy. Democratic frameworks or forms or procedures can be filled with a wide variety of cultural, social, historical, traditionally inherited, psychological, political and ideological contents, which deny the basic meanings and roots of democracy.

CONTRADICTIONS OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY

One of the important paradoxes of democracy stems from the potential contradictions of freedom and equality. Hence, the basic paradox is that the more pronounced the component of freedom, the more it violates the component of equality and vice versa. The tension or paradox of democracy is a disproportion between the two basic elements of democracy: liberal and social, therefore, between freedom and equality (Matić, 2002: 182-3). Liberalism and social democracy are the two dominant ideologies that are increasingly in the process of convergence. The principle of (social) equality as the equalization of people in terms of the degree of freedom appears as a necessary correction and improvement of the liberal concept of freedom. This way, a complete principle is constituted: freedom of equal civil status, i.e. equal or approximately equal opportunities and conditions for the practice of rights and freedoms. By approaching and meeting freedom and social equality, a basic model of political justice is created. By phasing out the liberal model of democracy, the social component is disrupted and social and economic inequalities are created.

The public order of rights and freedoms implies an appropriate balance relationship between freedom and equality. If equality is predominant and stronger, especially if it is extremely favoured, then freedom is restricted and simplified, collectivist or totalitarian pretensions are encouraged, creativity, criticism and choice are hampered. On the other hand, freedom without equality creates atomization, anarchy, irresponsibility, inequality and legal uncertainty. It is unproductive to proclaim or guarantee freedom in the conditions of imposed social differences. Moreover, equality does not make sense if freedom of choice and autonomy of will are constrained by the instruments of political power.

Demands for equality enhance various kinds of restrictions in the form of a paternalistic state, set a limit to freedom, produce uniformity, and call into question the very legitimacy of the community. Excessive affirmation of freedom incites inequalities and creates a society of the

privileged. The combination of the principles of liberal democracy and active participation are often imperative to overcome this imbalance. The rights to equal freedom must be protected in order that the democratic process could be effective and the government a legitimate one. The affirmation of the democratic principle means freedom in moderate equality and responsibility. Kant mentions the kind of political order which “allows the greatest possible freedom reinforced through the law according to which the freedom of each individual can be reconciled with the freedom of all others” (Sartori, 2001: 164).

Social rights and freedoms provide the material existence and protection from the risks and injustices of freedom. The turmoil of socioeconomic processes of the transition that created uncertainty and insecurity influenced people to sacrifice freedom for the sake of socioeconomic security. This commitment conducted by people also forms a system of expectations from the state. Thus, social and economic policy became the basic strategic function of the modern state, and the political trust of the citizens was conditioned by the implementation of this function. The political and legal activity of the state’s political power is aimed at the creation and application of the so-called social programmes as a set of norms of social legislation or through concrete measures and activities that intervene in the sphere of fundamental social relations in order to create the personal, economic and cultural welfare and the necessary standard of citizens.

The disproportion between these two elements in favour of the liberal substratum of democracy mitigates social substratum of democracy, that is, produces socioeconomic inequalities. The market challenge to democracy can produce negative implications, especially plutocracy of society, unemployment, low wages, which creates inequalities and thus creates a group polarization of society: powerful groups, middle class groups, the poor, weak and vulnerable groups. Inequality and poverty represent the fundamental determining generator of human weakness and helplessness in a transitional society of unconsolidated democracies.

INCONGRUENCE OF THE QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE

This section begins with one instructive finding by Erich Fromm:

It is naively assumed that if most people share common ideas and feelings that would automatically lead to a confirmation of those values and feelings. That is far from the truth. Unanimous assessment as such has no effect on reason and mental health. Just as there is madness for two, there is madness for millions. The fact that millions of people share the same vices does not make these vices virtues, the fact that they share so many errors does not make the errors to be truths, and the fact that millions of people share the same form of mental pathology does not make these people sane. (Fromm, 1980: 40)

Subsequently, it can be expounded that the collective majority that represents an opinion does not have to be the majority as a value, but as a quality. A number is required but not a sufficient condition. This stance is supported by Sartori who distinguishes the quantitative from the qualitative aspects of democracy. Translated into the field of democracy, a clear concluding position follows: the fact that the majority makes a decision does not mean that the decision is correct; the fact that someone wins a majority in the election does not mean that they will represent the interests of the majority; the fact that someone governs in the interest of the majority does not mean that the majority knows what its interest is; the fact that the majority elects does not mean that the elected will know and want to rule and govern in the interest of the majority; the fact that the elected should represent the people, does not exclude the fact that the majority may be unaware or unknowing of whether the representative will really govern in its interest.

It can be emphasized that the key paradox of democracy is evident in the fact that it is not possible to build democracy without a democratic culture of citizens, without a politically educated citizen, without a rational mentality, because otherwise the people appear to be the tutor of political rights without educational and cognitive competencies in the choice of political preferences and political affiliation. In that case, we have a democracy without democrats, or as Maurice Duverger calls it, "democracy without the people," an absurd phenomenon that the people are not aware and taught how to choose a responsible government, a phenomenon that democratic government can be alienated from the people's will. The analysis of the categories "majority" and "minority" (Vasović, 1993), leads us to some other paradoxes and illogicalities of democracy. The paradox stems from the variability of the meaning of the "majority" and the consequences of that variability for democracy. An analysis of all types of majority suggests that only the absolute majority has respectable legitimacy, as opposed to a simple or relative majority. Also, the legitimacy of the elected government depends on the ratio of the total size of the electorate and the size of the voters who went to the polls. Electoral and democratic practice show that political actors who win a relative majority show a desire for absolute power, even though a significant number does not go to the polls or the votes go to the other opposing candidates.

If the electorate consists of all adult citizens registered in the voter list, then the question is not why all citizens do not go to the polls (because that is impossible in practice), but what and how many of the total number of voters do not go to the polls (abstain): the higher the number of those who do not go to the polls, the overall majority of active voter decreases. Meaning, the number of those who go to the polls decreases. Sometimes that majority barely exceeds half of the total electorate. So, the lower the turnout, the less legitimate the government is.

For an example, 60 percentage of registered voters go to the polls and distribute (give) their votes to different parties. Thus, the party that receives the majority of votes according to the proportional electoral system can form a government with $\frac{1}{4}$ votes from the total number of the electorate. This clearly tells us that the party that forms the government and the parliamentary majority does not represent the factuality of the actual majority of registered voters. It means that it is governed in the name of the relative majority as a stable absolute majority and the government has no legitimacy even in quantitative terms.

In the majority electoral system (both in the case of an absolute and in the case of a relative majority), the list that receives fewer votes remains unrepresented in parliament or institutions, and the votes of the defeated opponent are completely lost as if they did not exist.

The electoral system is ideal if it produces the most accurate model of translating votes into mandates. The existing majority or proportional system has its pros and cons, shortcomings and weaknesses. However, it is forgotten that the electoral system is only a mechanical, technical, mathematical model that expresses the quantitative side of democracy, and that the essence or content of the voting will is also an important criterion of democracy, but increasingly neglected.

Because the voting will must be a value in itself, it must have an interest preference, it must satisfy the criteria of substantiality, freedom, autonomous will, rational-interesting articulation. Thus, the more the act of election and procedure itself is favoured, i.e. the so-called “electoral or electoral democracy,” the more the substantive and essential part of the electoral process is neglected. The consequences for the electoral process are twofold: on the one hand, the voting will of the people becomes the subject of political shaping from above, and on the other hand, the electoral procedure becomes a free corridor for political parties that are themselves antidemocratic. So, the more democracy is formalised, dogmatised, quantified, the ‘emptier’ it becomes.

THE STANCE ON THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION AND GOVERNANCE

Daniel Bell argues that national governments are, on the one hand, “too small to deal with big problems and, on the other hand, too “big to deal with small problems of individual cities or areas” (Giddens, 2005: 435). Problems that are global by nature cannot be the subject of an effective decision-making by national democratic governments. Global problems go beyond national government competencies. On the other hand, there is alienation or distance of the state in relation to everyday life. The basic democratic paradox viewed from this angle is that elected

democratic governments face reduced management capacity and the inability to represent the basic interests of civil society.

The more democracy globally unifies, the less effective it becomes in the context of the different traditions and experiences of individual countries and regions. The more it spreads in the world, the lower its quality. A universalization of one model of democracy regardless of the context is created: on the one hand, there is an attempt to promote, export and adopt one model of Western democracy, and on the other hand, societies of imported democracy do not have enough conditions, preconditions nor traditions for such democracy.

Textual and oral democracies neglect the context of introducing democracy into societies that have different development and factors that do not support democracy.

The crisis of political representation can be seen as (1) the problem of (non)representation of the interests of citizens and as (2) the crisis of managerial ability, i.e. the inability to govern, which Bobbio called the "immanent inability of governance" (Bobbio, 1995: 126). Non-representation of interests is seen as follows: instead of the elected government ruling in the interest of the majority, it rules in the interest of the minority, interest groups, powergroups, "power brokers" (officials, lobbyists, bureaucrats, the rich, etc.).

The crisis of the state's governing capacity is evident in the state's inability to respond to complex, various, numerous, often conflicting, frequent demands, interests and needs of society and to make appropriate decisions supported by the people. Hence, it could be said that we are dealing with a crisis of legitimacy. The crisis of governance and representativeness increasingly threatens the legitimacy of democracy and determines the dissolution towards autocracy, authoritarianism, populism and the enhancement of intolerance.

Immanent democratic incapacity to govern stems from the complexity of society. This requires professionalism and understanding of the subject matter. Thus, we find another paradox of democracy, that the government elected by the people is not capable of governing a complex society.

POLITICAL DEFICIT OF DEMOCRACY

Does the nature of politics and political power determine the quality of democracies? The nature of politics predominantly influences the nature of democracy. The immoral, repressive, manipulative pattern of politics transcends certain political forms of government, state organization and the organization of government. The skill of governance, the skill of power, is the skill of controlling the opinion, attitudes and behaviour of people – the manipulation of needs, interests, and significance of

events, phenomena and processes. Political power or the struggle for power has its own logic, regardless of the preceding attribute (democratic, liberal, social, etc.), regardless of the attributed symbols and their meanings.

Politics is the skill of gaining, maintaining, stabilizing and increasing power and/or ruling. Politics is the practice of power. The will to power, motivation-urge to rule, the inner need for domination, hegemony and the imposition of will (opinions, attitudes, interests) are an implied, shown and proven feature of politics. Therefore, the nature of politics, described in this manner, is contrary to the principles and norms of democracy: equality, freedom, justice, cooperation, autonomy of will, governance in the good interest of the people and politics within the framework of law (rule of law). The more immoral, authoritarian, manipulative politics is, the more democracy is at a loss.

From a rhetorical perspective, if presented as the rule of law, politics essentially and realistically represents the rule of selective law in a way that some have more rights and freedoms than others.

The narrower aspect of the political determination of democracy can be determined through the characterology of political parties. The internal oligarchic, centralised and leadership structure of parties often determines the external undemocratic nature of the political system. This contradiction between the autocratic and democratic characteristics of the internal party organization poses a great challenge to a sustainable democracy. Oligarchization, privatization and personalization of the party organization weaken its representative function because the general will, the general interest are subordinated to the individual and group interests of powerful groups.

On the other hand, corruption scandals, public scandals, clientelism and nepotism are expressions of moral pathology and kratological aberrations of political elites. Thus, the pronounced immorality of party politics does not arise only from the epochal separation of morality and politics, but must be explained by the pronounced pathology of political power either in the party or in state power.

Immoral politics and distrust in political parties and political elites in Serbia are especially evident in the personification of political functions, clientelistic-patron model of relations, the authoritarian and leadership nature of party politics, the poor selection and recruitment of party actors, pronounced intraparty centralism and dogmatism, the reduction of intraparty pluralism and the right to party factions and the connection with the marginal zones of criminal reality.

CONCLUSION

The possibilities of sustainable democracy are threatened by the contradictions between the democratic norm and the real democratic reality. Although democracy is still understood as the only legitimate political system, doubts about the functioning and quality of this system are evident. The belief in democracy exists despite the growing dissatisfaction with the effects of democracy.

Instead of society controlling the government, the government controls and shapes the society. Instead of expressing a freely formed democratic choice, citizens are increasingly voting by imposing elections. Instead of the democratic will being autonomous, it is heteronomous. Instead of a democratic government ruling in the interest of the majority and in the general interest of society, it increasingly rules in the interest of the minority and partial interests. Instead of developing democracy taught by good political practice, it is increasingly difficult to cope with aristocratic, oligarchic and authoritarian challenges. The disproportion between freedom and equality as the prevalence of one in relation to the other, creates non-freedoms and therefore inequalities or different forms of abstract equality without freedom.

Instead of democratizing politics, democracy is being partitioned. Immoral politics, as its epochal determinant, demoralizes democracy as well. Instead of democracy developing and advancing, it is increasingly dogmatized as an imperative of power and authority.

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ПАРАДОКСИ ДЕМОКРАТИЈЕ

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Резиме

Разматрање парадокса демократије је једна од метода утврђивања удаљености норме и стварности савремених демократских друштава. Са становишта партиципације и учешћа народа у процесу избора народних представника, преовладава чињеница да политичко друштво све више постаје контролисано и обликовано по мери интереса моћи и власти, уместо да политичко друштво преко избора и јавности контролише демократски изабрану политичку власт.

Инверзија демократских топоса постоји и у погледу „демократије као броја” и „демократије као вредности”. Демократска већина се све више математизује, а све мање представља општу вољу и супстантивну вредност. Математизована изборна воља је хетерономна, иначе формирана пропагандним техникама убеђивања и манипулацијама изборног процеса.

Са становишта демократске репрезентације и управљивости налазимо такође још један парадокс: да власт која је изабрана од стране народа да репрезентује и управља интересима друштва, није способна да управља сложеним и комплексним друштвом. Криза управљивости и репрезентативности угрожава легитимитет демократије и оријентише је према аутократији, ауторитаризму, популизму и јачању нетолеранције. Стање сложености и комплексности друштва захтева професионализам и разумевање процеса одлучивања и управљања.

Слобода и једнакост су основне вредности демократије. Оне нису искључиве или супростављене, већ комплементарне вредности које се приближавају, сажимају и коегзистирају. Преваленција слободе ствара социјално-економске једнакости, а преваленција једнакости ограничава и гуши слободу. Тако долазимо до парадокса да демократска друштва постају или друштва неједнаких слобода на штету једнакости или егалитарна друштва патерналистичке државе на штету слободе.

Политички парадокс демократије изражава се у томе што је природа политике у моћи, доминацији и потчињавању, а природа демократије у слободном изражавању политичке воље, несметаном изражавању интереса и потреба друштва, и праведној дистрибуцији добара и вредности.

Проблем имунизације демократије од ауторитарних, аристократских, тоталитарних и манипулативних техника владања може довести до самоукидања демократије и њене дисолуције према супротним политичким облицима и уређењима. Аутократска елитизација демократије и манипулативно обликовање изборне воље данас постају највећа претња успостављању, консолидовању и развоју демократије.