POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE PASHALUK OF BELGRADE ON THE EVE OF SERBIAN REVOLUTION (1787-1804) "

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Abstract

This paper presents the development of the political situation in the Pashaluk of Belgrade in the late 18th and early 19th century. On the eve of the 19th century, the Turkish feudal system faced the events that deeply shook the entire legal and socio-economic order in the empire. Under such circumstances, the Turkish Empire underwent major upheavals, which were caused by wars with Austria and Russia, the political changes in Europe, as well as the growing liberation movements of subordinated Balkan peoples. These movements, which were particularly prominent in the Pashaluk of Belgrade, gave rise to a massive liberation uprising of the Serbian people in the early 19th century, known as the Serbian revolution, which marked the beginning of a new era in the history of the Serbian people.

Key words: Austria, Pashaluk of Belgrade, janissaries, Serbian people, Turkey

POLITICHE PRILIKE U BEOGRADSKOM PASHALUKU U PREDVACHEREJ SRPSCKE REVOLUCIJE (1787-1804)

Апстракт

У раду је приказан развој политичких прилика у Београдском пашалуку крајем 18. и почетком 19. века. У предвечерје 19. века турски феудални систем суочио се са процесима који су дубоко уздрмали целокупан правни и друштвено-економски поредак у царству. Под таквим развојем прилика, Турско царство преживљавало је опасне потресе који су били изазвани ратовима са Аустријом и Русијом, политичким

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INTRODUCTION

Following the heyday of its political rise, the Turkish Empire in the mid-18th century entered a period of growing political and economic crisis, which culminated in the feudal anarchy at the beginning of the 19th century. Exposed to strong shocks, coming from European coalitions, the Turkish Empire also faced the growing penetration of new capitalist economic relations. The new economic relations, as well as the wars between the European countries and the Ottoman Empire, destroyed the Turkish feudal system, affected the political and economic emancipation of the subordinated Christians in Turkey, and resulted in strong economic connections between the Turkish state and Europe. This process was especially pronounced in the Balkans, where the focus of economic and social progress gradually shifted from the dominant Turkish-Muslim layer to the new forces that emerged from the ranks of subordinated Balkan Christians (Pantelić, 1949, pp. 105-110). Therefore, the process of disintegration of the Turkish feudal system led to the strengthening of the religious-national and socio-economic conflict in the Balkans. Exposed to all these shocks, the Turkish military-political and feudal system entered a serious crisis. Its consequences primarily affected the subordinated Christians, the so-called rayah, which was subjected to forced labor (chiflik), terror of authorities, forced migration, epidemics, and starvation. However, this crisis gave rise to the struggle for liberation of the Balkan peoples, which led to their national and political liberation in the 19th century (Stoianovich, 1994, p. 172). The last decades of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century represented a historic milestone in the development of the Serbian people, which had been under Ottoman feudal rule for several centuries. The wars of the European powers against the Ottoman Empire brought new shocks, and almost no war was waged without armed support of the peasant masses. Up in arms during the Balkan wars, the Serbian people suffered the consequences of the outcomes of such wars and the policies of forces that led them. Until the end of the 18th century, Serbian people fought during the Austro-Turkish wars that raged on through Serbia. During the 18th century, it became even more obvious that Austria was fighting to seize the territory of the European part of the Ottoman Empire, and that enslaved people, fighting for liberation from the Ottoman rule and their political independence, would not find support there (Radonjić, 1950, pp. 105-110; Đorđević & Fisher-Galati, 1981, pp. 47-50).
According to the administrative and territorial division of the Rumelia Eyalet in the late 18th and early 19th century, Serbia entirely or partially covered the territory of the following eyalets: Belgrade, Novi Pazar, Niš, Leskovac, Vranje, Peć, Priština, as well as parts of the Bosnia, Vidin, Skadar, and Prizren Eyalets. The territory of Serbia bordered the Bosnia Eyalet and Zvornik and Herzegovina Sanjak in the west, the Skopje and Tetovo Pashaluk in the south, and the Sofia pashaluk and Ćustendil Ayanluk in the east. It is estimated that in the geographical territory of Serbia in the late 18th and early 19th century, there lived about a million people, and that the same number lived in the surrounding area under the Ottoman rule (Ljušić, 1998, p. 24; Stojančević, 1955, pp. 3-4; Stojančević et al., 1994, p. 14). Of all the areas the Serbian people inhabited in Turkey, they were the most homogeneous in northern areas, i.e. the Pashaluk of Belgrade. The Serbian population was compact, interconnected with the old customary law and patriarchal institutions. Family cooperatives and the village were the backbone of their social organization. It is on the ground of the Pashaluk of Belgrade that the idea of liberation of the Serbian people was spawned, which led to a sharp conflict between the Serbian people and the Turkish state, and the outbreak of the Serbian revolution (Vukanović, 1975, pp. 24-30).

PARTICIPATION OF SERBS IN THE AUSTRO-TURKISH WARS

After the Austro-Turkish war, which lasted from 1737 to 1739, Serbia remained outside the war zone for a long time. Wishing to secure its southern border against the threats posed by Prussia and France, Austria signed a “perpetual peace” with the Porte in 1747. Driven by bad experience with Austria and its war (which led to the Second Migration of Serbs), the Serbs completely distanced themselves from Vienna, and hesitated for a long time to take up arms and embark on a new war adventure (Samardžić, 1960, pp. 46-52). However, Russian successes in the war against the Turks (1768-1774) forced Austria to establish their presence in the area of the Pashaluk of Belgrade and start its operation after a long hiatus. The intention of the Russian Empress, Catherine II of Russia, to liberate the Balkans from the Turks and bring its empire to the shores of the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, caused a great discomfort in Vienna. After the failure in the war with Prussia, Austria could not allow a failure in the Balkans. As each direct confrontation with Russia could cause its alliance with Prussia, Vienna decided on a policy of compromise with St. Petersburg (Zöllner, 1984, p. 320). Therefore, in 1780, in Mogilev, a meeting between the Russian Empress, Catherine II, and the Austrian ruler, Joseph II, was held, leading to the alliance between the two empires in 1782. The basis of the agreement was the division of the Balkan Peninsula into the
Russian and Austrian sphere of interest. Russia planned to create two new countries in the Balkans: Dacia, which would include Wallachia, Moldova, and Bessarabia, and Byzantium, with its capital in Tsargrad, led by Prince Constantine the Great, the grandson of the Russian empress. Austria, for its part, wanted the territory from Wallachia to Olt, Nikopol, Vidin, Orsova, Belgrade, and the shortest line from Belgrade to the mouth of the river Drina to the Adriatic Sea (Popović, 1996, pp. 117-123). Serbia was not involved in the Russian plan, and was not a part of any combination. Austria had a similar attitude, and did not support the creation of a new Serbian state, as it would mean the strengthening of Orthodoxy. Only a year after the establishment of the alliance, Russia attacked Turkey and occupied Crimea. The Russians then offered Austria to immediately jointly declare the war on Turkey, but Austria refused, claiming not to be ready for war. Although it refused to take part in the war, Austria immediately began scouting the area and strong political agitation among the Serbian population on the territory of the Pashaluk of Belgrade. Austrian agents quickly established numerous contacts with the Serbian leaders, who were exposed to serious oppression by the Turkish authorities and the janissaries, and eagerly anticipated alliance with the Christian state, which would bring them liberation from Turkish slavery (Gavrilović, 1978, pp. 36-60). As time passed, relations between Russia and Turkey deteriorated. Many unsolved problems culminated in 1787, when the Porte declared war on Russia. Austria did not immediately enter the war. It happened in February 1788. Turkish authorities closely monitored the developments in the Pashaluk of Belgrade. To prevent possible insurrectionist movements in Serbia, the Turkish authorities resorted to violent disarmament of the Serbian people during the Austrian war preparations (1787). In extensive actions, which the Turks carried out in a number of villages under the pretext of looking for hidden weapons, the Serbian people were subjected to intense terror of the Turkish military and Bashibazouk units. Fleeing from the Turkish terror, many people fled across the Sava and the Danube to the Austrian side, forming volunteer troops, “Free Corps” (Freikorps), under the command of Austrian officers. Austrian supreme command needed these troops to facilitate the operation of regular troops, and for causing a possible mass uprising in Serbia. Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian Free Corps was an active Austrian Major, Mihailo Mihaljević. When the attempt to make a foray into Belgrade and the surrounding fortifications with the help of the Serbs in early December 1787 failed, Austria launched military operations against the Turks in early February (Čorović, 1993, pp. 501-503).

1 Already in 1787, in the Black Sea port Kherson, Catherine II and Joseph II agreed on further steps the two forces should take against the Ottoman Empire. The first war operations in which Russia had success started during the same year (Stadtmüller, 1966, p. 80).
Serbian volunteers actively participated in the battles with the Turkish armed forces and the raids on Turkish ships on the Danube. Koča Andelković particularly distinguished himself among the Serbian volunteers who fought against the Turks. Born near Jagodina, he was a former trader, who fled from the Turkish terror to Austria in mid-1787. At the time, Radić Petrović fought side by side with Koča, forming the first Serbian troop with Koča Andelković and young Karađorđe Petrović. Koča actively participated in the battles against the Turkish forces. After the attack of the Austrian army and Free Corps on Smederevo, Koča refused to return to Austrian territory, and moved into the interior of Serbia with a group of fellow Serbian fighters. With his small troop, Koča attacked the Turks, and in a very short time liberated Požarevac, Hasan Pasha’s Palanka, Batočina, and Bagrđan, where he established his headquarters. Solidifying his position in the Bagrđan Gorge, Koča conquered the Tsargrad Road, which was the most important Turkish road in Serbia (Gavrilović, 1985, pp. 31-45).

The successes on the military front and great personal courage built Koča’s reputation among the people, so his troop grew to about 500 fighters in a short time. Having attracted additional manpower, Koča continued his attacks against the Turks. In a surprise raid, Koča and his fellow fighters attacked the janissary garrison in Kragujevac, where he achieved great success. People named this entire war effort “Koča’s Frontier”. Taking Kragujevac and cutting off the Tsargrad Road were the ultimate achievements by Koča and his fellow fighters. The Austrian command awarded Koča the rank of a captain and the gold medal, but denied him the much-needed military aid and weaponry. Serbian fighters were left alone, fighting almost daily with numerous Turkish detachments (Đorđević, 1979, pp. 19-30). The entire 1788 was full of missed opportunities. The Austrians did not initiate decisive operations, and the Turks consolidated after the first surprises and launched a broad offensive. The first target was the detachment of Koča Andelković. In mid-April, the janissary detachment, under the command of Deli Ahmet, began to suppress the Serbian rebels. As the Austrian command hesitated to launch decisive operations and failed to help Koča with arms and ammunition, whereas the Turks constantly brought in reinforcements, the position of Koča’s detachment was all the more difficult. Permanent attacks of the Turks, razing of villages, hunger due to poor crop yields, and Turkish preparations for a general attack on the rebellious areas made Koča dissolve the detachment and join the volunteer detachment under the Austrian command, as the leader of one of the troops. Having crushed the resistance of Koča’s and

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2 Arhiv Srbije (The Archive of Serbia; hereinafter referred to as: AS), Ministarstvo prosvete i crkvenih dela (Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs; hereinafter referred to as: MPs-P), 1841, fII, r 47, BNo. 1672, Ivanjica, October 1, 1841; Ibid, BNo. 1564/1841.
other detachments, the Turks began to implement a large-scale campaign of terror over the people. Fleeing from the Turkish handschars, a large number of Serbs left their homes and sought refuge in Austria. It is estimated that by the end of June, around 50,000 people fled to the monarchy. After crushing the Serbian detachments, in the summer of 1788 the Turks moved the battlefield to the Austrian soil. Their offensive in Banat surprised the weak Austrian forces, so the Turks occupied the entire southern Banat and entered Pančevo. In the battles with the Turks, captain Koča was killed while defending the mining town of Brzesko (Ljušić, 1993, pp. 32-40; Pantelić, 1930, p. 11). Similar to Koča’s detachment, the Homolje detachment of Marjan Jovanović was active as well. He gathered 300 fighters and went from Homolje to Resava, where his detachment, which had since grown to 700 people, cruised between Ćuprija and Požarevac. In this territory, Jovanović’s detachment remained until the beginning of May, when it was forced by strong Turkish pressure from Vidin to cross the Danube into Austria. In early 1789, Jovanović’s detachment returned to Serbia, but this time as a unit under the command of the Austrian army. In addition to Koča’s and Jovanović’s detachments, volunteer detachments under the command of the Austrian army officers, Mihailo Mihaljević, and Branavački took part in the fighting against the Turks. These detachments were from their very beginning under the command of the General Staff of the Austrian army, and they led the actions coordinated with the movements of the Austrian army units (Jaksić, 1937, pp. 39-42). Mihaljević’s detachment excelled in the battles for Šabac, in which the people of Šabac and Valjevo nahias also participated, as well as in actions in Valjevo and Zvornik, while Branavački’s detachment participated in the battles near Poreč, Brza Palanka, Kladovo, Negotin, and across the river Timok. Volunteer detachments received precious help from the people of the regions in which they conducted military operations. It was estimated that at the time of the uprising in 1804 there were about 18,000 soldiers who participated in war activities from 1788 to 1790, which represented a significant force with considerable military experience (Ivić, 1935, p. 67).

Turkish offensive in Banat did not last long. Insufficiently prepared for long-term warfare, the Turkish army quickly lost its offensive power and failed to utilize its initial success. In the fall, both sides agreed on a truce that lasted until the summer of 1789. The first months of 1789 caused major problems to the Austrian Empire. Their main competitor in the German world, Prussia, entered into an alliance with England and Holland, which was directly aimed against Austrian interests. When the news reached Vienna that Prussia intended to draw Turkey into the alliance, Austria decided on a swift and decisive military campaign in order to compel Turkey to capitulate. In late August, the Austrian army crossed the border and immediately began to expel the Turkish troops. In late September, the
Austrians conquered Belgrade, after which they began to advance into the interior of the Pashaluk of Belgrade. Despite significant military successes they achieved in the war with Turkey, the Austrian court increasingly considered ending hostilities with the Porte and making peace. The reason for this lay both in the resistance of the Hungarian opposition, which did not support the warlike policy of Joseph II, and in the changes in Western Europe that emerged after the outbreak of the French Bourgeois Revolution. Austro-Turkish war finished with the peace treaty in Svishtov, signed on August 4, 1791. With this peace, which was concluded with the mediation of England, Prussia, and Holland, Austria renounced all conquest in Turkey, with the exception of insignificant corrections of borders. This peace granted amnesty for Christians, Turkish subordinates from Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Wallachia, and Moldova, who fought in the war against the Porte (Popović, 1996, pp. 121-123).

**STATUS OF SERBS IN THE PASHALUK OF BELGRADE AFTER THE FINAL AUSTRO-TURKISH WAR**

When the Habsburg monarchy signed the peace treaty of Svishtov, thus abandoning the policy of conquest of the Balkan Peninsula, it became clear to the Serbian intelligence that the liberation of Serbia could only come by strengthening the national movements and relying on own forces. As soon as the signs were clear that Austria withdrew from the war, Serbian elders began to think independently about the possibility of further armed struggle, and then about the political battle to establish self-government. In January 1790, Stevan Jovanović, the Tronoša Archimandrite, asked Austria for help with soldiers and weapons in order to purge Serbia from the Turks, but was denied. When peace negotiations began in late 1790, Jovanović expected, given previous promises, that the Austrian emperor would put pressure on the Porte, so that the Serbs in the Pashaluk of Belgrade could obtain certain privileges. When all of that came to nothing, in 1791 Jovanović sent a proclamation to the Porte, demanding the same

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3 Field Marshal Laudon thanked the President of the Court Council of War, Count Hadik, who had given him the draft of the fortress, for a quick conquest of Belgrade (Regele, 1949, p. 58).
4 Selim III considered England “an important and traditional friend” of the Ottoman Empire during the Russo-Turkish wars (Shaw, 1971, p. 187). For more information on the influence of international policy and diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire, with special reference to the British, see: Palmer, A. (2011).
5 After the wars, which the Ottoman Empire survived, Selim III had the opportunity to carry out the reforms he had started. For more information about the reforms, see: Shaw & Shaw, 1976, pp. 260, 261-277.
rights for the Serbian people in the Pashaluk of Belgrade as the ones Christians in Wallachia and Moldova already had (Đorđević, 1979, p. 57; Ristanović, 2000, pp. 39-44).

Upon completion of the Austro-Turkish war, some of the measures that the Porte took to consolidate power in the Pashaluk of Belgrade were the following: banning janissaries to return to the Pashaluk of Belgrade and amnesty to the Serbian people to participate in the war on the Austrian side. The power in the Pashaluk of Belgrade was entrusted to Bećir Pasha, who executed a prominent janissary leader, Deli Ahmet, and issued a firman, prohibiting the return of janissaries to the Pashaluk of Belgrade. Bećir Pasha’s measures provoked a rebellion of janissary pashas of Niš, but it was quickly suppressed. The janissaries who were withdrawn from Belgrade and called to Tsargrad rebelled on the way through Bulgaria and joined Kardzhali detachments that roamed northwestern Bulgaria. Heading these detachments was a renegade from the Porte, Osman Pazvantoglu. In 1793, he managed to take power in the Pashaluk of Vidin, from where he sent his Kardzhali to raid Serbia and Wallachia. As one of the most powerful feudal lords in the Pashaluk of Vidin, Pazvantoglu did not recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan and the Porte, and gathered all the opponents of the central authorities in Tsargrad. After Bećir Pasha, who was sent to Bitola in July 1792, Mehmed Pekmedži Pasha was appointed the new Belgrade Vizier. Unlike the energetic and resourceful Bećir Pasha, the new Belgrade Vizier proved to be inert and inept, of which the expelled janissaries took advantage (Karadžić, 1947, pp. 15-23). In August, their detachments arrived before the walls of Belgrade, and then, with the help of the Belgrade Turks, seized the city and captured the Vizier. The news of janissaries’ return to Belgrade caused huge concern at the Porte, which immediately ordered the Bosnian Pasha and the Niš Muhaﬁz to go to Belgrade with their detachments and reestablish the authority of the imperial government. While the Bosnian army was easily broken, another army, under the command of the Niš Topal Ahmed-Pasha, succeeded in late November to break the janissaries and expel them from Belgrade. As a reward for the successful action, Topal Ahmed-Pasha was appointed the Belgrade Vizier in January 1793. He only stayed in this position for six months, but even that short period was enough for the Serbian people to remember him as a great tyrant and harach collector (Jakšić, 1937, p. 135).

Topal Ahmed-Pasha was succeeded by Hadji Mustafa Pasha, who became the Belgrade Vizier in July 1793, and, according to Vuk Karadžić, was one of the most important figures in recent Serbian history. As an educated, open-minded, and progressive man, Hadži Mustafa-Pasha thought
that only radical reforms could ensure peace and improve the situation in the troubled Pashaluk of Belgrade. Therefore, his appointment marked the victory of the forces in Tsargrad that had pushed for radical reforms in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Knowing about the relatively weak detachments of the imperial army, which could not cope with numerous janissaries and Kardzhalis, Mustafa-Pasha set out to organize Serbian military detachments. Turkish authorities were well aware that many of the Serbs had gained enviable military training and combat experience in the last Austro-Turkish war, and that they could be of great benefit in fighting the janissaries. As the Serbs themselves had an interest to get rid of the janissaries, it was logical to expect that they would do everything to help the authorities bring peace to the Pashaluk of Belgrade. The Serbian National Army, which was subordinated to the Turkish “imperial” service, was well armed and numbered approximately fifteen thousand people. It had its command staff (Haram-bashi and Boluk-bashi), and was led by a Bimbashi, Stanko Arambašić, a native of the Belgrade nahia (Stojančević, 1980, pp. 12-30). Immediately upon the appointment of Hadži Mustafa-Pasha, janissaries once again tried to occupy the Pashaluk of Belgrade. They took Požarevac by surprise, from where they went to Smederevo. However, they were defeated near Kolari, in battles with detachments of the Smederevo Turks and Serbian troops. The battle of Kolari showed that the Serbian detachments were disciplined and well organized and trained military units, which could be used for successful prosecution of the renegades. Hadži Mustafa-Pasha himself exclusively selected Serbian fighters for his personal security escort. As a reward for help in dealing with renegades from the imperial government, the first firmans were sent to Belgrade in August 1793, which gave the Serbs in the Pashaluk of Belgrade some self-governing privileges. Old national governments were established; the villages elected princes (knez), whereas the principals elected dukes (oborknez); the Turks were banned entry in purely Serbian villages. Princes were ordered to put up inns (han) for the Turks in the road-adjacent areas, so that they would not stop by at the Serbs to spend the night, which often caused conflicts. However, in case violence or robbery occurred, the princes were authorized to apprehend the culprits. The princes were allowed to keep the detachments of pandurs with Boluk-bashis in order to maintain road safety (Đorđević, 1979, p. 63). The amount of tax to be paid was determined (15 piasters per year for each head of the household), as well as sipahi’s duties and obligations to be paid to the pasha. Any violence against the Christian population was strictly forbidden. A special firman was issued, allowing the Serbs in the Pashaluk of Belgrade to renew and build their church. All of these self-governing privileges that Serbs received through the Porte’s firmans were in many respects similar to the privileges that the Turkish authorities gave to the Greek population of the Archipelago. New measures by the Turkish authorities, which guaranteed personal and property
security of the population of the Pashaluk of Belgrade, favorable socio-economic conditions in terms of abolition of the chiflik and the expulsion of the janissaries, as well as internal self-government that would protect the Serbian population, led to the fact that the economic power of Serbian villages significantly strengthened within a short period of time.

However, this situation in the Pashaluk of Belgrade did not last long. In the summer of 1797, the Belgrade Vizier, Mustafa-Pasha, was appointed Rumelian beylerbey, with a mission to restore the authority of the Porte in Vidin and purge Rumelia of outlaws. While Hadži Mustafa-Pasha was in Plovdiv, from where he directed operations against Pazvantoglu, the Vidin ruler ordered janissary-kardzhali detachments to attack Serbia. Sudden attack of Pazvantoglu’s troops completely surprised the Turkish and Serbian detachments near Požarevac, which retreated in disarray. After the conquest of Požarevac, the janissaries went to Belgrade, and took the lower town. The fall of the Belgrade Fortress was prevented by the Serbian detachments from Valjevo, which mounted a strong frontal assault on the janissaries and inflicted significant losses on them. Serbian detachments and Turkish imperial army continued to attack the janissaries, and soon expelled them from the Pashaluk of Belgrade. In early 1798, the Porte conducted extensive military preparations against Pazvantoglu, but attacks on Vidin remained without success. Mustafa-Pasha was therefore dismissed from the position of Rumelian beylerbey, and he returned to the Pashaluk of Belgrade (Ćorović, 1993, pp. 522-525).

The general situation in the Ottoman Empire rapidly deteriorated with the French invasion of Egypt in the summer of 1798. Aware of the fact that it could not at the same time wage war against the French and against separatist rebels, the Porte reprieved all the outlaws, among who were Pazvantoglu and the janissaries. In the beginning of 1799, the Porte’s firman granting the return of janissaries to Serbia arrived in the Pashaluk of Belgrade. The return of the janissaries meant a renewal of the Turkish terror and the onset of a new evil. After the return of janissaries to the Pashaluk of Belgrade, conflicts were more common. Eager for revenge, fanatical and rapacious, the janissary chiefs, stationed in the interior of the Pashaluk, immediately started to pillage and plunder. First, the commander of the Serbian armed detachments, Stanko Arambašić, was deceitfully killed, and then the efforts to take weapons from the Serbs started. Shortly after the murder of Stanko Arambašić, following the order of Zvornik pasha, the Tronoša Archimandrite, Stevan Jovanović, was murdered too. In late February 1800, the janissary unrest erupted in Šabac, resulting in the murder of two Serbian princes. Determined to severely punish the culprits

7 AS, Lićna zbirkà Ljubomira Kovačevića [Personal Collection of Ljubomir Kovačević], No. 366/1804
and at the same time send a clear warning to the janissaries that the law must be obeyed, Hadži Mustafa-Pasha sent a detachment of horsemen, who captured the troublemakers and then killed them in the middle of the Šabac bazaar. Another reason why Mustafa-Pasha clashed with the janissaries was because they refused to fight Pazvantoglu’s troops, which, in the spring of 1800, relaunched attacks on the border regions of the Pashaluk of Belgrade. Determined to get rid of Hadži Mustafa-Pasha and seize power, the janissaries organized a raid and captured Belgrade in July 1801. Mustafa-Pasha was kept in prison until mid-December, when the Belgrade dahias ordered his murder (Đorđević, 1979, p. 82). In the beginning of 1802, four dahias distinguished themselves as the chief organizers of the events in the Pashaluk of Belgrade: Aganlija, Kučuk Alija, Mula Jusuf, and Mehmed-Aga Fočić. The new Belgrade vizier, Hasan Pasha, who was appointed by the Porte, became their puppet and had no real power. Unable to restore order in the Pashaluk of Belgrade, the Porte feared that the janissaries could establish stronger links with the Vidin ruler, Pazvantoglu, which would further complicate the situation. Therefore, it opted for the policy of appeasement towards janissaries. Receiving the dahias’ promises that they would remain loyal to the Sultan, the Porte issued a special firman in early May 1802, absolving the Belgrade janissaries of any guilt. Since they received legitimacy from the Porte, the janissaries began to build power in the Pashaluk of Belgrade, where a period of terror ensued, as their main tool and hallmark in organizing and holding power (Radonjić, 1950, p. 320). The dahias were thereby given the opportunity to legalize their abuse in the Pashaluk of Belgrade. After that, the dahias turned to Serbs. The dahias were particularly embittered with the Serbs for their involvement in the fighting against the exiled janissaries and Pazvantoglu’s troops. All the privileges obtained by Sultan’s firmans in the period from 1793 to 1796 were immediately abolished, and Serbian principal self-government was nipped in the bud. Wishing to strengthen their power, the dahias banished from the Pashaluk of Belgrade all the sipahis who did not support their government. The banished sipahis, whose number was not small, sought salvation from the janissaries in the nearby pashaluks, while their sipahiluks were snatched by the masses of Muslims who, upon dahias’ invitation, flooded the Pashaluk of Belgrade. There was a significant influx of Muslims from Vidin, Bosnia, and Old Serbia, and it was in them that dahias found their main support for the brutal system of control over the subordinate Serbian folk. In addition to the arrival of Muslims from the surrounding pashaluks, the janissary forces grew stronger when some of their previous opponents turned to dahias. Fearing the resistance and unrest, the janissaries took special security measures inside the Pashaluk of Belgrade. In towns and provinces, the dahias appointed their kabadahias as musellims and dukes, who had an armed escort of 20 to 30 janissaries. In addition, each Serbian village had a subashi with several janissaries. Hans
were erected in provinces and in many villages, with a crew of 10 to 20 janissaries (Gavrilović, 1985, 47-50).

CONCLUSION

In mid-1802, the first attempt was made to get rid of the dahias. It was organized by sipahis and other “imperial” Turks, with the participation of the Serbs. The Turkish side in this conspiracy actively involved Hasan-Bey, Mehmed-Aga Konjalija, and Mutiš-Aga. Due to a conflict with the dahias, these Turks had to leave their estates and escape to Zemun, where they made contact with the fugitive Serbian merchants and princes. Based on the agreement between the sipahis and Stevan Stanošević (who led the fugitive Serbian rulers), the preparations for the uprising against the dahias in the Pashaluk of Belgrade began in early March. The center of Serbian resistance was located in the town of Beli Potok, in which the smuggled weapons and ammunition began to arrive. The main role in bringing down the dahian authorities in Serbia was entrusted to sipahi Tosun-Aga and Serbian princes, brothers Marko and Vasa Ĉarapić.8 The rebellion against the dahias began in mid-June. Having gathered a detachment of 1,900 people, 500 of which were Serbs, Tosun-Aga headed from Krajina in the direction of Požarevac, from where he planned to forcibly head for Belgrade and surprise the janissaries. At the same time, Stanošević and his comrades moved from Zemun and brought the ammunition and weapons to Beli Potok, where a number of Serbs awaited them. The Serbian detachment then went in the direction of Belgrade and deployed around Avala, expecting the arrival of Tosun-aga, in order to then jointly attack the janissaries. However, after a few days, the Serbs learnt that the janissaries completely shattered Tosun-Aga on two occasions (on the Morava River and near Jagodina), and that the joint attacks on the dahias would be futile. Subsequently, the gathered Serbian detachments withdrew from Avala and went deeper into the interior of the Pashaluk. The failed attempt against the dahias in 1802, which was more a conspiracy than an uprising, impinged on the Serbs only. Many Turks who were involved in the uprising reconciled themselves with the dahias and, as a sign of reconciliation, handed them a list of Serbs who participated in the anti-dahian movement. Tosun-Aga himself reconciled with the dahias, and became the “fifth dhai” (ĐorĊević, 1979, p. 92; StojanĊević, 1980, pp. 21-24).

8 AS, Knjaževa Kancelarija, XII, 66, Kalenić, March 21, 1820; Ibid, XII, 76, Jagodina, June 2, 1820; AS, MPs-P, 1841, f II, r 47, KBNo. 1595/1841.
violence threatened the safety of life and property. This situation affected all layers of the Serbian people. During the two-year dahian rule, Serbian people in the Pashaluk of Belgrade were so pressured by exploitation and abuse that the way out of this situation could only be sought in direct collision with the dahian system. Slaughter of the princes (serb. Seča knezova) accelerated the widening of the obvious gap between the Serbian nation and the Turks, and served as the immediate cause of the outbreak of the Serbian revolution.

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ПОЛИТИЧКЕ ПРИЛИКЕ У БЕОГРАДСКОМ ПАШАЛУКУ У ПРЕДВЕЧЕРЈЕ СРПСКЕ РЕВОЛУЦИЈЕ (1787-1804)

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Резиме

Последње деценије 18. и почетак 19. века представљају историјску прекретницу у развоју српског народа, који се више векова налазио под турском феудалном владавином. Ратови европских сила против Османског царства доносили су нове
потресе а готово ниједан рат није протекао без оружане подршке сељачких маса. Устајући и сам на оружје у време ратова на Балкану, српски народ је трајео и све последице исхода таквих ратова и политике сила које су их водиле. Све до краја 18. века, српски народ је устајао на борбу у верме аустро-турских ратова који су се водили и преко Србије. Током 18. века још очигледније се показало да Аустрија ратује како би освојила територије европског дела Турске и да поробљени народи, који се боре за ослобођење од османске власти и за своју политичку самосталност неће наћи код ње подршку. Процес распада турског феудалног система довео до јачања верско-националних и друштвено економских сукоба на Балкану. Изложен свим овим ударима турски војно-политички и феудални систем улазио је у све већу кризу, која су се нарочито осећала у европским турским провинцијама. Њене последице су на подручју Београдског пашалука погодиле потчињене српско хришћанско становништво такозвану рају, која је била изложена читљућену, терору власти, присилним миграцијама, епидемијама и глади. Међутим, из ове кризе настала је ослободилачка борба српског народа која је довела до великог ослободилачког устанка и национално-политичког ослобођења српског народа у 19. веку.