

THE LOSS OF NIŠ IN 1689 AND OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY ^a

Marija Kocić*, Haris Dajč

University in Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, History department, Belgrade,
Serbia

**marijakocich@gmail.com*

Abstract

The conquest of Niš (1689) by the Habsburg army affected diplomacy of the Porte. This was especially evident in negotiations it had started several months before in Vienna with the members of the Holy League. This paper is based on the documents kept in the archives of Vienna and London. It also discusses the situation in the Ottoman state presented from the point of view of diplomats accredited by governments, who take different positions on many issues. This paper is an attempt to assess in a wider context the impact of this Habsburg victory, so far interpreted primarily as a part of military history, on European events of that dramatic period, because certain contemporary publications suggest the impact was not negligible.

Key words: Ottoman Empire, Niš, Vienna, Zulfikar Effendi

ГУБИТАК НИША 1689. И ОСМАНСКА ДИПЛОМАТИЈА

Апстракт

Пад Ниша је био значајан јер су у исто време трајали преговори у Бечу између чланица Свете лиге и Османског царства. На тај начин је војни пораз директно утицао на преговарачке позиције османске стране у Бечу. На основу необјављене архивске грађе из архива у Бечу и Лондону може се сазнати колико брзо и на који начин су промене на бојном пољу утицале на мировне преговоре. Неуспех османске стране у преговорима је окрио значај Београда који османска страна није ни под којим условима желела да препусти Светој лиги. Поред тога безбедност самих преговарача је зависила од ситуације на бојном пољу. Пад Ниша је условио даљи неуспешни продор Хабзбурга који се завршио повратком Ниша под османску власт.

Кључне речи: Османско царство, Ниш, Беч, Зулфикар-ефендија.

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*BETWEEN NEGOTIATIONS AND WAR: OTTOMANS AND
HABSBURGS BETWEEN BUDA AND KARLOWITZ*

The loss of Buda (1686) and the defeat at Nagyharsány (1687) were harbingers of doom for the Ottoman rule in Hungary. Situation became even worse when the Habsburg army conquered Belgrade (1688). The victor had the route through the Balkans via Stambol-yol wide open. In the beginning of 1688, individuals gathered around the new Sultan, Suleiman II (1687-1691) began to advocate a treaty with Leopold I (PRO, SP, 97/20, f^o 125-128^r; Hammer, 1979, III, p. 42). Other contemporaries, however, suggest that Leopold I initiated the negotiation process (Leti, 1691, p. 255). The ambassador of Venice in Vienna, Federico Cornaro stated the initiator was the Dutch ambassador at the Porte, Jacob Collier (1680-1718), who managed to convince the Grand Vizier to negotiate (Fiedler, 1867, p. 290).

In June 1688 the Divan-ı Hümayun (Imperial Council) decided to send to Vienna a negotiator to identify the conditions of the forthcoming treaty in talks on equal terms. The Porte offered to have Ardeal in a semi-independent position led by a duke selected among local nobility. Kanije and Zigetvar were to be destroyed, and a border established on the Danube. In Poland they were ready to evacuate Kamieniec and have it destroyed afterwards. They asked Venice to abandon their conquest in Morea (Peloponnese) and certain other islands (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-1, pp. 86-89). With its decision to send a delegation to Vienna, the Porte ceased its practice of *ad hoc* diplomacy, something the Ottoman state had practiced since its establishment (Ari, 2004, p. 36-59).

Hamdi Effendi was chosen as the team leader, being a “wise and cautious” man, originating from “a region bordering Persia” (Радонић, 1941, p. 398), and he was supposed to travel to Vienna with Alexander Mavrokordatos. On June 26, Hamdi Effendi suddenly fell ill. On the same day his position was given to Zulfikar Effendi (Радонић, 1941, pp. 399-400), a man of Turkish origin, previously posted as baş muhasebeci (chief clerk). He was given the task to inform Leopold I on Suleiman II’s taking power and to find a way to make a “good treaty” (Battaglini, 1711, IV, p. 343), whereas Alexander Mavrokordatos was given the role of his advisor (Sk, R, 6097/71, 1/E, f^o 23).

Contemporaries of Zulfikar Effendi considered him “a bad choice” for the given position (Самарцић, 1992, p. 118). Cornaro, who had the opportunity to get to know him, though, noted he was “a man with a lot of prudence, experience, and his expositions reveal sagacity” (Fiedler, 1867, p. 291). Vienna gave more prominence to Mavrokordatos, who enjoyed a post of the chief interpreter of the Porte, and maintained contacts with diplomats. “Although Christian by birth, by his soul he was a Turk” (Fiedler, 1867, p. 297), which made him suitable for the mission he was given as far as the Porte was concerned.

The deputation left Constantinople on July 10, 1688 with an entourage of around sixty people (Самарцић, 1992, p. 188). Other sources, however, estimate the entourage consisted of a hundred people (Zenarolla, 1690, p. 19). In early September Zulfikar Effendi was in Niš (Радонић, 1941, p. 398). Several days later he arrived in Belgrade, from where he sent the Sultan a letter describing the fall of the city (September 6) into the hands of the Habsburg army (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-1, p. 96). Victor also had a representative of the Porte in the entourage (Battaglini, 1711, IV, p. 319). Their host was Maximilian II Emanuel, elector of Bavaria and commander-in-chief of the Habsburg army in Belgrade (Setton, 1991, p. 367). They soon received a permit to continue their journey, escorted by 300 Croats that followed them (Battaglini, 1711, IV, p. 320).

The ambassador of France, Pierre Girardin, thought it was realistic that the deputation will be successful. In their discussion immediately before departing for Vienna, Mavrokordatos convinced Girardin that, in case a war starts in Europe “the Sultan will not listen to the peace negotiations by members of the Holy League, even if they offered him everything Mehmed IV lost” (Самарцић, 1992, p. 118). Nevertheless, Girardin concluded a new war could only accelerate a peace accord, so he failed to mention to the chief interpreter of the Porte the intention of Louis XIV (1643-1715) to declare war against Germany. Under such circumstances, the role of the French ambassador changed, as he became the main link between Versailles and the Porte in the realization of French “Eastern politics”. When first hints were given that the Porte will send a deputation to Vienna, Versailles was determined that those negotiations should fail. Such politics started in September 1688, at the time the deputation was trying to obtain a permit in Belgrade to proceed towards Vienna (Purnell, 1924, I, p. 299).

Understanding that the Ottomans were sufficiently defeated to accept the possibility of a “forced” treaty, Venice and Poland decided to send their representatives to Vienna. Warsaw sent Palatine of Pomerania, duke Potoczki, with empowerment and instructions for negotiations. Venice chose the regular ambassador in Germany, Federico Cornaro, and Girolamo Capello, the secretary of the Council of Ten (Consiglio di Dieci) (Garzoni, 1720, p. 321). Franz Ulrich, count Kinsky, grand chancellor Theodor von Strattmann, Guido von Starhemberg, and Antonio Caraffa were authorized to represent Leopold I in these negotiations (Zenarolla, 1690, pp. 15-16, 20-22). Only Vatican had no representative in the negotiations, despite the fact that the Pope was the main initiator of the formation of the Holy League (1683-1684) (Коцић, 2012, pp. 66-75).

Charles V, Duke of Lorraine and Bar, travelled to Buda, where representatives of the Porte were situated, to discuss problematic issues. When discussions yielded no palpable results, he joined the army in Osijek, while the deputation arrived in Vienna on February 8, via Innsbruck (Zenarolla, 1690, p. 12). After a half-an-hour reception, the Porte

representative and his entourage were followed into the city by units specially selected for that occasion (Zenarolla, 1690, p. 19). On the following day, Tuesday, February 9, 1689, the representative was received by count Guido von Starhemberg in his castle, since chairman of the War council, Ludwig von Baden, was in Ratisbon.

The first “official” meeting was held on February 12, 1689 (Setton, 1991, p. 367). This and subsequent meetings took place at the court in Vienna (Hammer, 1979, III, p. 42). In a large room, a table was positioned and representatives of Leopold I, Venice, and Poland were seated on one side, while the Ottomans were on the other. At the eighth meeting on March 12, 1689, the allies presented their counterproposals. They asked to be given Hungary, the right to fortify border strongholds, free trade with the Ottoman state, and exchange of prisoners. The Tatars who were rooted in some parts of Moldavia were to leave this duchy. Venice insisted that all its conquests be accepted. The Porte was to respond to these conditions within 30 days and, if accepted, apply them within six months (Setton, 1991, p. 368). Tradesmen from England and the Netherlands doing business in the Ottoman Empire planned to demand lower taxes, but soon abandoned the idea (Garzoni, 1720, p. 324). A contemporary of these events and a biographer of Charles V, Duke of Lorraine and Bar, could not resist the impression that Zulfikar Effendi showed no desire for the negotiations to succeed and for a treaty to be drafted as soon as possible (Birlic Nolano, 1699, p. 260).

Peace negotiations in Vienna were simultaneous with the Truce of Ratisbon, which produced a document of 30 articles (Birlic Nolano, 1699, pp. 264-266). Discussions in Ratisbon revealed that anti-French disposition was widespread among the German public (Leti, 1691, III, p. 482-483). The most important decision made in Ratisbon was to declare war to France. It resulted in a convergence of Versailles and the Porte, and proposals for a potential alliance (Leti, 1691, III, p. 484). London was certain of the success of Zulfikar Effendi, since the English believed Vienna negotiations were destined to fail (Purnell, 1924, I, p. 312). Their belief was shared by General Enea Silvio Piccolomini, who informed in March a Leopold I resident in Dubrovnik, colonel Domenico Corradini, that peace was not forthcoming (Радонић, 1941, p. 611).

Grand vizier Bekir Mustafa Pasha (1688-1689) left Edirne during a tense situation. Authorities failed to eradicate the remnants of recent rebellions, one of which brought Suleiman II to power. Defeats of the previous years increased the animosity between Muslim majority and dhimmis. While Muslim fundamentalism was on the rise, Greeks followed with hope the advance of the Cossacks towards Crimea (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-2, p. 53). In mid-July news came that the Russians reached Ozi (*Очаков* in Russian), and the battle with the Tatars ensued (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-2, p. 62).

The new war made Louis XIV pay more attention to the relations with the Porte. In the beginning of June 1689 French tradesmen in Constantinople received an order to collect 20,000 thalers in order to help Imre Thököly (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-2, p. 52). Soon after, Louis XIV resorted to more resolute measures. His ambassador received instructions to prod the Porte into continuing its war with the League. He sent a letter on this matter to the Sultan (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-2, p. 61), received by abbot Girardin, the brother of the late ambassador, who was performing this duty until the new ambassador was appointed.

Ludwig von Baden left Belgrade on June 1 (Bizozeri, 1690, p. 384) and led his army towards Smederevo. One of the spies reported the Ottomans were too close, which made von Baden consider retreating to Belgrade. In fact, there were 40,000 Ottoman soldiers encamped near Jagodina, joined by the enlisted mob and the Tatars. When he reached Hasan Pasha's Palanka (nowadays Smederevska Palanka), count Hofkirchen received different information. Spies informed him there were fewer Ottomans than previously assumed (Zenarolla, 1690, p. 61-62). That was the decisive information that made Ludwig von Baden turn towards Niš.

Niš was a town at a main Balkan crossroads, which experienced progress and developed into an important Oriental town during the 17th century. From the period of development, described by Evliyâ Çelebi (*Evliyâ Çelebi*, 2001, pp. 188-189), to the Vienna War (1683-1699), it was evidently impoverished, as proved by only 400 houses (1689) within it (Bizozeri, 1690). Despite that, it retained its strategic significance due to its position in the communication lines used to deliver supplies and arms to Belgrade and fortifications in Hungary (Тричковић, 1983, p. 197). The significance of the town for Austria was obvious from a 1719 report, which stated the following:

“For Niš is the only point in our way presenting an obstacle, and once we take it, we will have direct passage all the way to Constantinople” (Протић, 1889, p. 15).

Advancement of the Habsburg army through Serbia did not provoke any reactions in Constantinople at first. During August, William Trumbull (1686-1689) was convinced the Habsburg army is positioned “at their side of Belgrade”, not at the Ottoman side (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 142). His report also revealed that the events in Serbia were hidden from the diplomats and the general public (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 145). Trumbull feared the most the opinion of new Louis XIV's ambassador, Pierre Antoine Castagner de Chateauneuf (1689-1699), whose arrival was expected (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 145).

By the end of August, the army of Leopold I reached Resava. Among its ranks was Luigi Ferdinando Masigli as an inspector (Zenarolla, 1690, p. 109). At that time, ca. 50,000 Ottomans reinforced by Tatars were headed

towards Požarevac, trying to prevent the advancement of the Germans (Zenarolla, 1690, pp. 110-111). The army of Leopold I was decimated by the plague or some other infective disease. Due to large mortality rate of soldiers and horses, and a lack of supplies, their advancement was slow (Zenarolla, 1690, p. 122). The battle took place near the village of Grabovac on August 29, and on the following day in the vicinity of Batočina (Самарџић, 1992, p. 146; Веселиновић, 1993, p. 512). Having learned that the Habsburg army was closing in, the Ottomans left the camp, so the Germans took it without force. Ludwig von Baden informed Domenico Corradini about his success near Batočina, and Corradini thought this victory deserved *Te Deum laudamus* to be played in Dubrovnik (HHStA, Sk, R 6097/71, 1/F, f° 95).

The defeat in Batočina caused dissatisfaction in Constantinople and Edirne. The Grand Vizier was ill or, as it was suspected, he was pretending to be ill (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 143'). In a report from October 2, 1689 it was noted that the defeat in "the first battle" (as usually cited) caused dissatisfaction of janissaries and other services, aimed at the serakser (minister of war), Receb Pasha. The rebels claimed the army had enough men and was well equipped when it went towards Belgrade. However, the army was defeated due to misinformation given by Thököly and the French (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-2, pp. 92-93). Receb Pasha also had many supporters, and he ordered them to enter the tents of the rebels and kill them. Sources from Dubrovnik also testify there was a rebellion in the army after the defeat at Batočina; according to these sources, it started after the army returned to Sofia and was fuelled by supporters of Yegen Osman Pasha (HHStA, Sk, R, 6097/71, 1/F, f° 67').

In mid-August 1689, Trumbull received the order to work towards achieving peace between the Porte and Leopold I (Purnell, 1924, I, p. 314). Collier received a similar order from the Netherlands, and he informed Trumbull (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 149). Two of them agreed quick action was needed, but were afraid of Chateaufort, who demanded reception at the Porte soon after his arrival. However, since the Grand Vizier was absent, his audience was scheduled for September 19 at ten o'clock in the morning with the Constantinople kaymakam. Using his connections and perseverance, Collier, together with Trumbull, was received by the kaymakam two hours before Chateaufort. In their conversation, Collier expressed his intention to travel to Sofia and talk to Bekri Mustafa Pasha face to face. The kaymakam stated that there was nothing more important than peace, but that he was not in a position to make such an important decision. His cunningness lies in the fact that he refused to issue Collier a travel permit, but suggested that he address the Grand Vizier by letter instead (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 149).

Edirne once again became the center of the state where all important decisions were made when the Sultan returned there. The Grand Vizier

was in Sofia, where he tried to introduce “certain changes”. After the rebellion, he dismissed 7,000 sipahis under the pretext they were of no use, and favored the janissaries instead. By his estimate, a peace treaty should be agreed upon during the winter; otherwise an attack should be launched with the help of the French (HHStA, Sk, R, 6097/71, 1/F, f° 78). Those who were well informed doubted he would personally take part in the new campaign, which seemed destined to fail (HHStA, Sk, R, 6097/71, 1/F, f° 78'). Alexander Voner also arrived in Edirne and fully informed Versailles (Самарцић, 1992, p. 146), and also Trumbull (Purnell, 1924, I, p. 306), with whom he had close relations, but Chateaufeuf was displeased with that, so he decided to eliminate him.

In the spring of 1689, Venice Senate chose Leopold I Girolamo Venier (1689-1693) as the ambassador to Vienna. Before leaving for Vienna, he met the imperial ambassador to Venice, Francesco della Torre. At that moment, negotiations had been stalled for four months and distrust was evident among the allies, so their actions could not be steered by common interest. Venice was particularly affected by Vienna's decision to publish the information regarding negotiations in the newspapers (Garzoni, 1720, p. 347-348).

OTTOMAN LOSS OF NIŠ AND HABSBURG WAR SUCCESSES

Ludwig von Baden remained in Batočina until September 16, when the Habsburg army started towards Niš and reached a field outside Niš in six days (Веселиновић, 1993, p. 513). On the following day, September 23, they took possession of Aleksinac (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-2, p. 97) and on September 24, they finally conquered Niš (Веселиновић, 1993, p. 513).

The news of the conquest of Niš was received with exaltation in Vienna, but other members of the Holy League also considered this event an ideal occasion to celebrate. After the death of Pope Innocence XI (1674-1689), in a tense atmosphere of conflicting interests, it took almost a month and a half for the new pope, Alexander VIII (1689-1691, previously cardinal Pietro Ottoboni), to be elected on October 6 (Коцић, 2012, pp. 310-311). On the following day, October 7, the Pope ordered that *Te Deum* be played in St. Peter's church in the Vatican in honor of Ludwig von Baden's victory in Niš, to introduce his first appearance before the masses as the new pontiff (Zenarolla, 1690, p. 172).

This loss took the Porte by surprise, convincing the wiser Turks that the previous decision had not been attuned to what the current situation required. The news came together with a courier sent from Vienna (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 143'). Before that, on September 21, Chateaufeuf asked for a permit to travel to Sofia accompanied by an agha. When he realized how much time it would take, he decided to send his interpreter (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 149). However, he changed his mind soon afterwards and personally went to Sofia, where he arrived on October 3.

Chateauneuf's stay in Sofia did not meet his expectations. He was given his first audience on October 6 (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 149'). His first appearance before the Grand Vizier was organized in accordance with the standing diplomacy principles implemented by the Porte (Kocić, 2013). When he left Constantinople, he brought along the entire personnel of the embassy (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 150). In the course of his first audience, Chateauneuf offered the Porte an alliance. On the other hand, Bekri Mustafa Pasha tried to obtain some information concerning the war France entered into, with remarks in no way pleasant to Chateauneuf. The new Louis XIV's ambassador used the opportunity to submit a memorandum on the position of the French merchants in the Ottoman Empire, as he was entitled to. Two days later (October 8) he had a private audience with Bekri Mustafa Pasha (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 149'). The final audience with the Grand Vizier took place on October 12, and the following day he left the city. The cost of the visit amounted to 28,000 akçe, and was covered by the Porte (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 149').

William Trumbull tried to take advantage of the unfavorable news to accelerate negotiations. In a confidential discussion, a vizier (whose name is not mentioned) revealed that he personally wanted the negotiations to succeed. A new session of the Divan-ı Hümayun had to be held for the decision whether the war should be continued (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 143'). The Porte kept every measure it took strictly confidential, so Trumbull could only guess what the final decision would be (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 144).

Zulfikar Effendi was definitely taken by surprise with the news that Niš was lost. He could not comprehend how the Ottoman army could be defeated by a substantially weaker Habsburg army (Zenarolla, 1690, p. 129). Cebecibaşı of Belgrade, Mustafa-aga was captured by the victors after the city was conquered (September 1688) and was subsequently taken to Vienna. When negotiations reached a stalemate (May 1689), Zulfikar Effendi decided to send him to the Porte. However, during the battle of Batočina, he was recaptured. He was taken to Smederevo, where he was heavily guarded. Receb Pasha intervened on his behalf, asking Ludwig von Baden to issue him a passport so he could continue with his journey (Bizozeri, 1690, p. 395). He arrived in Sofia 32 days later, on September 26, at the time the Divan-i Hümayun was in session, so he gave his account of that event after his arrival to Constantinople.

The Divan-ı Hümayun decided that Mustafa-aga should travel on the following day (September 27) with new proposals. For that travel, the defterdar (treasurer) appropriated 3,000 ducats. At that moment, the news that Niš had been lost arrived. According to contemporaries, this event directly resulted in Suleiman II's decision to move to Edirne together with the Grand Vizier. A decision was made to remove Receb Pasha, and replace him with Ibrahim Pasha, who distinguished himself the same year in defending Negropont (Battaglini, 1711, IV, p. 357; Garzoni, 1720, p. 335; Foscarini, 1722, p. 339).

After its victory in Niš, Vienna suggested that everybody keep whatever new possessions they took (Самарцић, 1992, p. 147) (the *uti possidetis* principle). This initiated a session of the Divan-i Hümayun where the radical change of position of the other side was to be discussed. It was a Divan-i Hümayun “like no vizier had attended in many years”, attended by all officials, officers, and army representatives. Vienna demanded not only a new border near Niš, but also a handover of entire Hungary, whereas Timișoara, Gyula, and Varadin should remain in the possession of the Ottomans. Venice was supposed to retain its conquered territories, and Poland was to retain Kamieniec (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-2, pp. 79-79’).

On the same day, the commander of the imperial guard was sent to Plovdiv, Edirne, and Constantinople to declare a new *nefiram* (call to Muslims to defend their faith and country, issued by the authorities). It asked of all able-bodied volunteers (Muslims) to gather in Sofia (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-2, p. 88; Самарцић, 1961, p. 182). The response came from many of those who believed peace was a chance to consolidate the situation in the country, which harmed primarily Chateaufort’s plans (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-2, p. 90). On the other hand, Ludwig von Baden, elated by victory in the battle of Niš, which earned him considerable reputation, made plans to conquer Constantinople (Birlic Nolano, 1699, p. 273). Everything suggested a compromise was not possible. Enthusiasm from the success on the imperial side and peace efforts of the Sultan’s subjects on the Turkish side could not produce a balance of power that could result in peace. Insistence of the Porte to keep possession of Belgrade was a good reason for the negotiations to fail, as was the elation in Vienna, caused by the advancement of Leopold’s army.

Vidin was lost several days after Niš, which made the Grand Vizier decide to send Thököly and Tatars to attack the city. At that time, William Trumbull learnt from the newspapers that arrived from England that William Paget was named special envoy in Vienna (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 150’). By that time he had ceased all contact with Chateaufort and the French in Constantinople (Purnell, 1924, I, p. 317).

In addition to serakser replacement and halted negotiations, the loss of Niš had other consequences, as well. Bekri Mustafa Pasha dismissed many janissaries and sipahis, fearing there were rebels among them. The Sultan himself was apprehensive (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 151), since he also came to power through rebellion. Trumbull was convinced that the defeat in Niš affected the replacement of Bekri Mustafa Pasha (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 151’). The Bostancıbaşı (Chief Executioner) was sent to take a seal (tug) from the Grand Vizier, and bring him captured into Edirne, where he was soon strangled (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 151’).

The new Grand Vizier, Fazil Mustafa Pasha (1689-1691), “with a name that itself sounded like a guarantee of revival” (Мантран, 2002, p.

298), was a blood brother of Grand Vizier Fazil Ahmed Pasha (1656-1676) (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 152). The decision for him to be elected can be attributed to Suleiman II, who prevented a rebellion with that move (Contarini, 1710, II, p. 208). At the time of his election (November 1) (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-2, p. 116) he was 52, he had considerable experience in the government (Hammer, 1979, III, p. 46), and he had the title Pasha of Chios. First estimates suggested he needed several weeks to arrive to the Porte. In the meantime it did nothing (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 155). Chateaufort kept insisting Imre Thököly should be named Duke of Wallachia. The insistence was due to the intention of Louis XIV to turn Thököly into a useful ally to weaken Leopold I (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 156).

Fazil Mustafa Pasha excelled in his knowledge of Islamic law (sharia) and was more prone to trusting the opinion of the people than that of the saray. He was an antipode to the previous Grand Vizier, who would indulge in sodomy and wine and delegate officials to make important decisions (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 152). The person who was the most satisfied with his election was Chateaufort (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 152), who saw it as a perfect opportunity to obstruct Vienna negotiations. Although he had immense qualities, the new Grand Vizier was aware of his inexperience on the battlefield. Therefore, he invited all experienced and respected commanders to Edirne, hoping to win them over (HHStA, Hs, 132/1020-2, p. 118).

In early December 1689, the public in Constantinople was overflowed with manic religious rage, seeking revenge for defeats and recapture of lost territories. Although Mustapha Pasha Köprülü tried to present himself as a practical administrator, nobody doubted (or wanted to doubt) that he was capable of restoring the army and pushing the enemy across the Sava. With such general mood, Jacob Collier saw no reason to remain in Edirne, whereas Chateaufort kept working on disrupting negotiations “detrimental to all of Christianity” (HHStA, Hs 132/1020-2, p. 136).

In December 1689, Zulfikar Effendi was kept under guard in Vienna (PRO, SP, 97/20, f° 166). This was confirmed by a document made several years later (1694), which states that he was treated that way because of “disrespect and revenge” (HHStA, Hs 132/1020-7, p. 162). Nikola Samardžić (2007, p. 97) also pointed that out and cited: “[...] especially after the humiliation the Ottoman delegation experienced (1688-1689), he was abused, scorned and, after the negotiations failed, imprisoned for several years”. Ottoman negotiators were transferred to Komárno and later to Pottendorf, awaiting the Porte’s decision on the continuation of negotiations (Garzoni, 1720, p. 348).

At the Divan-ı Hümayun session held towards the end of 1689, the Sheikh ul-Islam asked the new Grand Vizier to take an oath on the Qur’an that infidels will not be given a single town with a mosque (Battaglini, 1711, IV, p. 358). Conscription of soldiers continued (Garzoni, 1720, p.

357; Contarini, 1710, II, p. 211). Under such circumstances, “forced allies” France and the Porte were forced to get together, which gave a lot of space to Chateauneuf. The Porte started using French ships anchored in Constantinople and other ports to deliver supplies and weapons (Contarini, 1710, II, p. 213).

THE HABSBURG LOSS OF NIŠ AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WAR

Mustapha Pasha Köprülü was leaning towards peace, but only under the condition that the Ottoman state take back the territory south of the Sava, which was supposed to be the border. If that happened, the Ottomans would rule Belgrade again (Радонић, 1941, p. 723-724). Having been sent earlier, Mustafa-aga arrived in Vienna in the beginning of 1690 (Zenarolla, 1690, p. 223). The other side received a letter in which Mustapha Pasha Köprülü ambiguously expressed his idea of peace. Simultaneously, at the Truce of Augsburg on January 24, it was decided that the son of Leopold I, Joseph, would be crowned the new King of the Romans (Leti, 1691, III, p. 554). Encouraged by this decision and previous victories, Vienna came up with counterproposals that destroyed any illusion peace was possible.

The Porte was supposed to pay six million ducats as reparations and two million annually for a permit to transport merchandise and provisions via the Danube and disclaim possession of Hungary. Zulfikar Effendi would not dare to accept these conditions, so he was ordered to prepare for departure on January 25, 1690. When he and Mavrokordatos reached Komárno, they both fell ill.

The Ottoman counterattack came very soon. The advancement of Piccolomini, who started from Niš in October 1689 via Prokuplje towards Kosovo, and later on to Skopje, was stopped in winter. Their decision to dismiss the Sultan’s authority and accept Leopold I as their sovereign, affected the Serbs in Kosovo, including distressed people, craftsmen, and tradesmen, who were forced to flee rather than wait for Albanian troops to come and exact their revenge. General Friedrich Veterani arrived in Niš on January 9, 1690, when a decision was being made in Vienna to defend either Ardeal or Serbia (Тричковић, 1983, p. 200). Since the former took priority, Serbia was left with a weak Habsburg army supported by detachments of recruited local volunteers. In only a few months, all its successes were annihilated (Катић, 2002, p. 103-115). On September 9, 1690, the Ottomans conquered Niš and committed a series of atrocities against the population (Тричковић, 2000, pp. 307-326; Веселиновић, 1993, p. 529). The jewel in their crown was the reclaiming of Belgrade (Battaglin, 1711, IV, pp. 372-373; Garzoni, 1720, pp. 383-385; Contarini, 1710, II, pp. 238-239), which meant the former border was reestablished. Zulfikar Effendi and Mavrokordatos were still kept guarded, and the

following year (1691) they were taken to Pottendorf “to renew negotiations” (Anonim, 1693, p. 259; Самарџић, 1961, p. 241; Battaglini, 1711, IV, p. 345). However, by then the mission had lost any significance to both warring sides, while new peace attempts were left to the initiatives of English and Dutch ambassadors to the Porte.

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ГУБИТАК НИША 1689. И ОСМАНСКА ДИПЛОМАТИЈА

Марија Коцић, Харис Дајч

Универзитет у Београду, Филозофски факултет, Београд, Србија

Резиме

До времена преговара у Бечу практикована је унилатерална дипломатија заснивала се на диктирању услова, које је друга страна могла да прихвати или одбије. С друге стране, констелација односа у Европи, која се поделила на два супротстављена тора, није поредствљала повољан подстицај да они успеју. Преговори у Бечу све време остали су у сенци ратовања и успеха проистеклог из њега. Дипломате на Порти следиле су курс, које су њихове владе диктирале, чиме су настојале по инструкцијама које су добијали од њих да делају. Иако су по неким савременицима преговори доспели до критичне тачке с пролећа 1689, Зулфикар-ефендија остао је у Бечу, чиме су они на „вештачки начин“ одржавани. Освајање Ниша пружио је Леополду I и његовим саветницима мотив за нове захтеве, у крајњој супротности са одлукама Дивана који је послао преговараче у Беч. Догађај који је подбедницима улио наду, а пораженима освешћење, произвео је супротне сентименте неускладиве са њиховим реалним позицијама. Иако је град неколико месеци касније османска војска успела да поврати, преговори у Бечу запечаћени су оног тренутка када је Беч изнео захтев да граница буде постављена код Ниша. Они су открили и неспособност Порте да парира дипломатији практикованој у Европи. У наредним мировним покушајима (Марсиљска 1691-92, Конерада ван Хемскерка 1692-93, Ремзовског 1693-1694) Порта се управљала по властитим начелима све до пораза код Сенте 1697, када је Вилијему Пациту и Јакову Колијеру поверила улогу медијатора на преговорима у Карловцу (1699). Наредни велики мир је био у Пожаревцу. Догађаји из 1689. описани у воом раду су значајни за разумевање и Карловца (1699) и Пожаревца (1718).