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THE ELUSIVE SUBSTANCE OF POPULISM: STRUCTURE OF POPULIST IDEOLOGY IN THE NETHERLANDS

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Abstract

This paper provides a detailed study of Dutch public opinion data in order to establish to what extent there are elements of an organized ideological structure that could be termed 'populist'. The first part of the paper examines the relationships among several of the typical attributes of populism, such as ethnocentrism, economic redistribution, and anti-elitism are analysed. The goal is to examine to what extent these attributes tend to converge towards a higher-order populist ideology. The second part of the paper examines the added explanatory value when populist attributes are entered as predictors of party preferences, in addition to variables operationalizing the traditional politics. Attitudinal profiles of supporters of populist parties from the opposite sides of the ideological spectrum are compared. Finally, attitudinal roots of populist parties' preferences are compared against those of the mainstream, established parties. The outlined problems are examined using data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES).

The results provided no evidence for the existence of a more general, substantively grounded populist ideology, only for the thin populist core, containing various indicators of political alienation and anti-elite orientation. With regard to the ideological content, the findings suggest that, in Dutch public opinion, populism equals right-wing populism. Furthermore, no support is found for the claim that anti-elite 'core' is a common ideological ground that unites supporters of left- and right-wing populist parties. Finally, the 'thin ideological core' of populism proved inconsequential for understanding party preferences in the Netherlands, whether populist-labelled or otherwise.

Key words: populism, ideology, ethnocentrism, political alienation,
political parties, the Netherlands

НЕУХВАТЉИВА СУШТИНА ПОПУЛИЗМА: СТРУКТУРА ПОПУЛИСТИЧКЕ ИДЕОЛОГИЈЕ У ХОЛАНДИЈИ

Апстракт

У раду се анализира у којој мери јавно мњење Холандије показује елементе организоване идеолошке структуре која би се могла назвати популистичком. У првом делу рада се испитују релације између неколико кључних атрибута популизма, као што су етноцентризам, економски егалитаријанизам, и анти-елитизам. Циљ је да се утврди у којој мери ти атрибути конвергирају ка општијој популистичкој идеологији. У другом делу рада се анализира додатна експланаторна вредност када се популистички атрибути као предиктори партијских преференција додају варијаблама које чине стандардни модел политичке подршке. На тај начин се пореде идеолошки профили симпатизера популистичких партија са супротних страна политичког спектрума. Коначно, пореде се идеолошки корени симпатија према традиционалним политичким партијама и онима означеним као популистичким. Емпиријску основу за проучавање наведених проблема представљају подаци истраживања јавног мњења у вези Холандских парламентарних избора. Резултати не подржавају идеју о постојању општије, супстантивно засноване популистичке идеологије. Међутим, изолована је димензија која одговара 'танкој суштини' популизма, која се састоји од индикатора политичке алијенације, анти-елитизма и политичког цинизма. С обзиром на идеолошку садржину, тј. улогу етноцентризма, у јавном међу Холандије популизам је једнак десничарском популизму. Затим, подаци не подржавају виђење да је анти-елитизам она идеолошка суштина која је заједничка како за левичарски тако и за десничарски популизам. Коначно, 'танка суштина популизма' се показала као статистички небитна за разликовање партијских преференција у Холандији, било за партије које се сматрају популистичким било за традиционалне партије.

Кључне речи: популизам, идеологија, етноцентризам, политичка алијенација, политичке партије, Холандија

INTRODUCTION

Populism is a concept with ambiguous meaning. It is sometimes described as a rhetorical style that characterizes parties and leaders, such as appeals to popular sentiments or the opponent's elitist and corrupt nature, but not necessarily implying any specific ideological substance. Populism has also been defined in a more substantive manner, as an ideology that involves a set of specific policies, such as import-substitution economic policy (Schamis, 2006). Intermediately, populism has been conceptualized as a 'thin ideology', implying that "its thin nature means that it is unable to stand alone as a practical political ideology: it lacks the capacity to put forward a wide-ranging and coherent programme for the solution to crucial political questions" (Stanley, 2008, p. 95). In practice, this means that populism's core, i.e. the distinction of 'people vs. elite', is to be found in combination with other, more established ideologies.

The aim of this paper is to examine to what extent the construct of general populist ideology is applicable to the Dutch public opinion. The focus is on the coherence between various ideological dimensions that are often associated with the concept of populism, whether left or right, such as ethnocentrism, preference for economic redistribution, anti-elitism and political alienation. Covariance of these orientations toward a higher order ideological dimension of populism would provide empirical support for the claim that populism is not simply a political label, but that it denotes a specific set of ideological attributes. It would mean that ‘populism’ is a term that can be used without additional qualifications, such as ‘extreme left’ or ‘radical right’.

Given the literature’s emphasis on the centrality of the distinction between elites and the people for the definition of populism (e.g. Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2013; Mudde 2004; Stanley 2008), at least anti-elitism should correlate with the substantive ideological dimensions, and/or with the support for parties commonly labelled as populist, regardless of whether they are left or right, extreme or not. This paper can therefore be seen as an empirical counterpart to Stanley’s (2008) theoretical discussion of the ideological core of populism. Likewise, the paper responds to Akkerman et al.’s suggestion that “it will be interesting to see whether populist attitudes correlate with other attitudes. For example, are the differences between left-wing and right-wing populism also reflected in attitudes toward issues such as crime, immigration, the economy, and European integration?” (2013, p. 1346).

In the following section I elaborate the theoretical framework and specify the main research questions. Afterwards, I provide some contextual details about the Dutch case. In the remainder of the paper I present the research method and the results, and finally discuss the findings.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts a bottom-up, empirical, approach towards defining populist ideology. Starting from ideological elements that can often be encountered in discussions of populist politics, it tries to find coherence among them. When populism is seen as a *political style*, different actors, episodes, and policies could be given the attribute of ‘populist’, but this would not imply a particularly strong coherence between the labelled phenomenon and any other ideological or policy element (Taggart 2000: 95-8; Taguieff 1995).¹

¹ Zaslove, for instance, distinguishes ‘politicians who employ populist themes, such as Tony Blair and Nicolas Sarkozy, and true populists such as Jörg Haider or Silvio Berlusconi’ (2008, p. 331).

According to Canovan, populism is not simply a style. It should be seen as a 'thin centered' ideology, where the populist 'core' can be and needs to be combined with other ideologies (Canovan, 2002), such as ethnocentric or anti-immigrant orientation in case of the contemporary right-wing populism (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Some authors are more explicit about the ideological core of populism. In Mudde's view, populism is "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Stanley (2008) also argues that 'people vs. elite' is the core of the 'thin' populist ideology. He is also explicit in stating that "its thin nature means that it is unable to stand alone as a practical political ideology" (p. 95). The implication from this view seems to be that 'populism' without additional attributes is not an analytically useful concept. More importantly for this paper, it also suggests that attitudes associated with preferences for populist parties are variable, but that anti-elite element should *always* be an element of populist orientation.

The flexibility of the concept of populism is visible in models that differentiate several 'kinds' of populism. According to Zaslove (2008), three distinct forms of populism are radical-right populism, centre-right populism, and left populism. The most popular category in recent literature, without doubt, is the radical or extremist right-wing populism (Zaslove, 2008). Typical elements in this ideology, especially if scholars are dealing with European cases, are ethnocentrism, anti-elitism, anti-corruption, and economic egalitarianism (Betz, 1993; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn, 2014). Ivarsflaten (2008), for instance, finds that a grievance over immigration (or ethnocentrism in the vocabulary of this paper) is 'what unites populists in Western Europe'.

In the above conceptualizations, populist core has vague and changeable ideological correlates. However, when populism is conceived as a fully structured ideology, various populist attributes are expected to be more coherent, to converge towards a single higher-order dimension, and have consistent correlates among party preferences. Rooduijn (2014) provides empirical evidence to this hypothesis by finding convergence of nativism, populism, and authoritarianism towards a higher-order dimension of right-wing populism.

In light of the outlined state of the populism scholarship, it is clear that the description of the populism phenomenon is an open issue, especially since its manifestations differ across time and contexts. The first task in the present research is to examine to what extent some of the key attributes ascribed to various manifestations of populism converge together towards a more coherent and general ideological orientation.

This goal is in line with a recent research by Rooduijn (2014), although he deals only with the populist radical right. He is also concerned

with the convergence of populist attitudes, and their ability to predict party preferences in the Netherlands. Three ideological dimensions studied are populism, authoritarianism, and nativism. The author concludes that “there is a deeper-lying second-order factor that explains the correlation between these three latent factors. Apparently, a PRR [populist radical right] ideology exists as a coherent latent attitude not only among parties but also among the public. [...] this PRR attitude is strongly related to voting for the PRR Freedom Party (PVV)” (Rooduijn, 2014, pp. 88-9).

The present study could be seen as an extension in the direction taken by Rooduijn, as it uses Dutch data as well, but covers the period before 2010, includes additional right-wing parties as well as the mainstream and left-wing parties, and examines the predictive power of populist attitudes against the traditional politics model.

There are similarities and differences in the operationalizations of the main attitudinal dimensions. Rooduijn’s nativism is very close to the current measure of ethnocentrism. Some of the items measuring authoritarianism are included in the present study, as well (e.g. attitude towards crime). Rooduijn also measures populist views by surveying opinions about politicians. For instance, respondents are asked whether ‘politicians are corrupt’ (Rooduijn, 2014, p. 84). Similar attitudes are included in the present research, particularly within the construct of political cynicism. The present study, however, includes additional measures much more directly relevant for the concept of populism: first and foremost the anti-elite orientation, but also political alienation, political cynicism, and political efficacy. For instance, question V48_1 from the external political efficacy scale explicitly contrasts the ‘people like me’ and the political elite: “Members of parliament do not care about the opinions of people like me” (see Appendix for more details).

The following clusters of attitudes, or populist attributes, according to much of the literature on populism, comprise most contemporary populisms, or are combined with the ‘thin ideological core’ to produce a particular populist ideology or a world-view:

Anti-elite orientation, scepticism about representative democracy, and political alienation represent the first cluster of attitudes. This is close to the core of Mudde’s definition of populism, which emphasizes the imagined elite vs. people division (Akkerman et al., 20013; Mudde, 2004; Fennema, 2005; Pauwels, 2010).

Ethnocentrism and its varieties, such as anti-immigrant orientation, rejection of asylum seekers, xenophobia, ‘nativism’, and so on, is another key populist element. This orientation and the political parties advancing it attracted researchers’ attention towards the end of the 20th century, as the tensions between ‘native’ populations and a growing number of immigrants increased. Ivarsflaten found this to be the only common predictor of RW Populist Party preferences across several European countries (Ivarsflaten,

2008). Van der Brug and Fennema argue that these parties should be in fact called anti-immigrant parties (Van der Brug and Fennema, 2007).

Preference for *egalitarian economy* is another ideological dimension associated with populism, usually of left-wing qualification. However, its status within the populist framework is controversial. Although economic egalitarianism is typically observed on the populist left, egalitarian preferences have also been observed among radical right populist parties (Derks, 2006; Pauwels, 2010). According to Derks, "Populism as a 'thin' ideology does not contain any specific economical doctrine", yet its contemporary manifestations have been consistently associated with specific economic policy preferences, especially anti-welfarism (Derks, 2006). Populism of the right-wing "does not take on the form of a universal notion of egalitarianism, but rather of a particularistic and utilitarian in-group identification" (Derks 2006: 181). Thus, following Derks, a certain kind of egalitarianism can also be found on the populist right.²

Finally, in the European context, the attitude towards the *European unification* is also relevant. From one perspective, this evokes isolationist and nationalist sentiments on the right wing and anti-globalist concerns on the left. This is another element that may unite populists on the traditionally opposed sides of the political spectrum.

The more the tendency towards structuration among the populist indicators is visible, the more ground there is for the idea of a general populist ideology, or at least its thin core. Operationally, the problem is approached by comparing factor analyses of the populist attitudes over time. If general populist ideology underlies the relationships between the presumably populist attitudes, we would expect that all or most variables load significantly on the first principal component, together with the anti-elite and other political alienation attitudes.

If the mass-level populist ideology is politically consequential, the populist attitudes should be predictive of party preferences over and above both the socio-structural variables and the traditional left-right ideology. Otherwise, the traditional lines of conflict and ideological oppositions would be sufficient to explain public attitudes towards these parties. Therefore, I compare multiple regression models that operationalize the traditional politics (socio-structural variables, and left-right ideology) with those that also include the 'populist attributes'. It is expected that populist variables are stronger predictors of preferences for the presumably populist parties than for the mainstream parties. It is insufficient to merely examine whether populist attitude correlates with preferences for parties labelled populist (e.g.

² "In the case of contemporary right-wing populism, appeals to 'real' egalitarianism and 'fair' redistribution as well as radical criticism of the welfare state go hand in hand" (Derks, 2006, p. 179).

Akkerman et al., 2013). The relationship should be controlled for the standard predictors of party preferences.

The Netherlands has had parties that are considered populist on both sides of the political spectrum. If the claim about a substantial core of populist ideology that transcends the traditional ideological division is correct, then we should also expect that some of the populist attitudes correlate with preferences for populist parties on both sides of the traditional division – in the same direction. For instance, if that core is represented by the sense of political alienation, this variable should be positively associated with the attitudes towards both left-wing and right-wing populist parties.

The Dutch Case

The conspicuous instability of the Dutch party system in recent years has often been attributed to the impact of populist parties. The turbulent elections of 2002 and 2003 are associated with the electoral breakthrough of *List Pim Fortuyn* (LPF) (Bélanger and Aarts, 2006; Van der Brug, 2003). Anti-immigrant and anti-elite rhetoric quickly qualified LPF for the radical right populist label. However, since the social-liberal views expressed by its founder diverge from social authoritarianism typically associated with right-wing populist parties, a number of authors classify LPF as a neo-liberal populist party (with Lijst Dedecker in Belgium) (Pauwels, 2010).

More recently, The Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV) came into the spotlight as a new Dutch contribution to the extreme right populism. PVV won nine seats in the 2006 parliamentary election, and after the 2010 elections it became the third largest party in the Dutch Parliament. In general, PVV is closer to the more usual description of a right-wing populist party, due to its combination of ethnocentric views and political authoritarianism (Rooduijn, 2014).

Several other parties on the right-wing have often been termed as populist. Centre Democrats (*Centrumpartij*, CD) showed some electoral success in the 1990s (and in 1981 in its earlier incarnation as *Centrumpartij*). Both parties are typically described as nationalist and ethnocentric. Liveable Netherlands (*Leefbaar Nederland*, LN) is another party in this group. Pim Fortuyn started his political career in this party. Ideologically, LN espoused a critical attitude towards political establishment and bureaucracy, a demand for more immediate democracy, and demand for anti-immigrant policies.

Populism in the Netherlands, according to a number of authors, could also be found on the left wing. Socialist Party (SP), which became the third strongest party in the country after the 2006 parliamentary election, has often been quoted as a representative of the left-wing populism (Pellikaan, De Lange and Van der Meer, 2007).³

³ Mudde (2004, p. 548) also believes that west-European ‘new left’ of the 1960s and 70s could be labelled as populist because of its anti-establishment attitudes. Such view

With allegedly populist parties on different sides of the ideological spectrum, the Dutch case provides an attractive case for studying various manifestations of populism in contemporary politics.

METHOD

The outlined problems are examined using the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) data. DPES studies are based on face-to-face interviews using probability samples of the Dutch population, typically conducted in at least two waves – before and after parliamentary elections. The newly created cumulative data set contains studies from 1971 to 2006 and is freely accessible through the DANS archive.⁴ Most of the reported analyses focus on the period between 1994 and 2006, which covers the period of the recent rise in populist left (SP) and right (LPF and PVV).

Variables

The notion of the elite vs. people division, crucial in many conceptions of populist ideology (Mudde, 2004), is a member of a broader cluster of attitudes that also includes scepticism about representative democracy, and political alienation.

Scepticism about representative democracy is covered by two items:

V35_1 Dissatisfaction with democracy in the Netherlands;⁵

V35_2 Parties are unnecessary for functioning of democracy.⁶

Anti-elite orientation and *political alienation* are measured by three composite variables:

V47_4 Political cynicism score;

V48_6 External political efficacy score;

V49_4 Internal political efficacy score.

Construction of these variables is shown in the Appendix.

would suggest treating GroenLinks as a left-wing populist party. However, this would be a lonely view, so this party is not treated as such here.

⁴ Data Archiving and Networked Services – <http://www.dans.knaw.nl/>. For more details about the data-set and variables used, see Todosijević, Aarts & van der Kaap (2010).

⁵ Question text: ‘*On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the Netherlands? Higher score indicates dissatisfaction.*’

⁶ Question text: ‘*Some people say that political parties are necessary to make our political system work. Others think that political parties are not needed in our country. On this card ‘1’ means that political parties are necessary to make our political system work and ‘5’ means that political parties are not needed in the Netherlands. Which number applies to you?*’

There are two indicators of *ethnocentric orientation* that are used over several Dutch election studies:

V41_10 Ethnic minorities – respondent's preference;

V43_10 Asylum seekers – respondent's preference.

Agreement with the first item (and higher score) means '*foreigners and ethnic minorities...Should completely adjust to Dutch culture*'.⁷ For respondents, this typically means immigrants from Suriname, Morocco, Turkey, and more recently Eastern Europe. Agreement (and higher score) with the second item means that the government should '*Send back as many asylum seekers as possible*').

Preference for *egalitarian economic redistribution* is measured by a single item:

V38_10 Income differences – respondent's preference.⁸

Political authoritarianism is operationalized by an item asking for respondent's views on the punishment of criminals:

V39_8 Crime – respondent's preference.⁹

Attitude towards the *European unification* captures isolationist and nationalist sentiments, and is measured by the following item:

V42_11 European unification – respondent's preference.¹⁰

Sympathy towards different political parties is a variable that represents respondent's general evaluation of different political parties.¹¹

⁷ Note that the 2006 study asked about foreigners, while the earlier studies referred to 'foreigners and ethnic minorities'.

⁸ Question text: '*Some people and parties think that the differences in incomes in our country should be increased (at number 1). Others think that these differences should be decreased (at number 7). Of course, there are also people whose opinion is somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this line?*'

⁹ Question text: '*People think differently about the way the government fights crime and tries to preserve law and order. Some people think that the government is not tough enough, while other people think that the government should be tougher on crime. At the beginning of this line are the people (and parties) who think that the government is acting too tough on crime (at number 1); at the end of this line are the people (and parties) who think that the government should act tougher on crime (at number 7). Where would you place [yourself] on this line?*'

¹⁰ Question text: '*European unification is well under way. The countries of the European Union have decided to work more and more closely together. However, not everybody holds the same view about it. Some people and parties think that European unification should go further. Others think that European unification has already gone too far. Suppose the people and parties who think that European unification should go further are at the beginning of this line (at number 1) and the people and parties who think European unification has already gone too far are at the end of the line (at number 7). Where would you place [yourself] on this line?*'

¹¹ Question text: '*And now I would like to know from you how sympathetic you are towards the political parties. You can give each party a score between 0 and 10. With*

Responses are given on a scale from 0, meaning 'very unsympathetic', to 10, meaning 'very sympathetic'. The variable is closely related to voting behaviour, since most respondents actually vote for parties they like the best. However, sympathy score may be more interesting for the analysis of the role of populist ideology for several reasons. Vote choice may reflect various factors, not necessarily one's preferences, such as in the case of strategic voting. Sympathy scores are also preferable on methodological grounds. Instead of a single categorical variable, we can analyse a set of quasi-interval variables.

Left-Right self-placement is perhaps the most central measure of traditional political orientation (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990). The scale uses the usual 11-point format, from 0 (left) to 10 (right).

RESULTS

The Structure of Populist Ideology

The first part of the analysis focuses on the question: To what extent the typically populist attributes co-vary among the Dutch public? Since not all attitudinal variables are observed in each election study, I performed two sets of factor analyses. In the first one, I focused on variables that appear in each examined study. I report only the unrotated principal components, since the primary aim here is to see if the included attitudes could be considered indicators of a more general populist ideology. In the second analysis, I include additional attitudinal variables, and rotate the extracted factors.

Attitudinal variables that appear in each study in the 1998-2006 period are shown in Table 1. The results reveal a consistent structure over time. In each study, two significant components are extracted (eigenvalues above 1.0). The first component in all years is represented primarily by political alienation items, i.e. the external political efficacy (including the anti-elite attitude) and political cynicism (in the opposite directions, of course), together with ethnocentrism. The second dimension revolves around the egalitarian economic preferences, coloured by the tolerant attitude towards ethnic minorities, and with internal political *inefficacy*. The position of internal political efficacy changed over time. While in the earlier years it was the opposite of egalitarianism, it increasingly became a part of the alienation-ethnocentrism syndrome. Another observable trend concerns ethnocentrism. While it is consistently clustering together with the alienation variables, it became increasingly negatively associated with egalitarianism. In general, the results demonstrate that attitudes associated with populism, even if reduced to such a small number of indicators, cannot be considered a single ideological dimension, which is in accordance with

this 0 means that you not sympathetic towards this party and 10 means that you are very sympathetic towards this party. What score would you give the [SP]?'

the ‘thin ideology’ view. The populist core in the Netherlands goes together with ethnocentrism.

*Table 1. Dimensions of populist attitudes:
Principal component analysis results*

	1994		1998		2002		2003		2006	
	PC1	PC2	PC1	PC2	PC1	PC2	PC1	PC2	PC1	PC2
V38_10 Income differences should be reduced		-.81		.90		-.81		.88		.89
V41_10 Ethnic minorities – adjust to Dutch culture	.61		-.54	-.35	-.56	.36	.55	-.56	.51	-.45
V47_4 Political cynicism score	.73		-.77		-.74		.73		.71	
V48_6 External political efficacy	-.80		.82		.80		-.79		-.80	
V49_4 Internal political efficacy	-.39	.58	.49	-.33	.40	.57	-.52		-.53	
Variance explained	34.1	21.4	35.8	21.2	34.1	22.4	34.8	22.9	34.5	21.0

Note: Unrotated principal components. Loadings above .33 shown.

Additional insight into the nature of populist ideology could be provided if the variables are factor analysed and factors rotated. Table 2 shows the results. Note that this analysis includes some of the variables that do not appear in each study, and therefore the comparison should be seen as exploratory. The results demonstrate that if a broader set of populist attitudes is examined, more dimensions are needed to account for their co-variation. Thus, in 2006, 2002, and 1998 three factors are extracted.

Dissatisfaction with Dutch democracy typically accompanies the political alienation items, especially political cynicism and external efficacy. This dimension is close to the ‘populist core’ (e.g. Stanley 2008; Akkerman et al., 2013), although its content is somewhat broader than usually assumed.

Internal efficacy sometimes joins this dimension (2003), but more often goes together with preference for income *inequality*. Economic egalitarianism and a sense of personal *inefficacy* seem to fit the populist left. However, internal political efficacy is a much more personal, self-referential, dimension, quite distant from the theoretical concept of the thin populist core.

The remaining dimension is primarily defined by the ethnocentric orientation, and often with lower loading of the Euro-sceptic attitude. The latter attitude has often been interpreted as potentially uniting the (extremes of) traditional left and right. Thus, the occasional convergence of Euro-scepticism with ethnocentrism demonstrates its right-wing affinity, and its affiliation with economic egalitarianism (years 1994, 1998, and 2002) reveals its left-wing side. It is also important to note that when ethnocentrism and economic egalitarianism load the same factor, their loadings are in the opposite direction.

To summarize this set of findings, three core orientations seem to be apparent. One revolves around political alienation and the sense of distance from the political regime, and resembles the ‘thin core’ of populism. It includes variables such as dissatisfaction with Dutch democracy, political

cynicism, and low sense of political efficacy. Ethnocentrism is another clearly discernible dimension, sometimes close to Euro-scepticism, and sometimes with economic inegalitarianism. Economic attitude is related to the other two orientations, but does not really represent a core element of any of them.

Table 2. Factor analysis of populist attitudes

	2006			2003		2002			1998			1994	
	F1	F2	F3	F1	F2	F1	F2	F3	F1	F2	F3	F1	F2
V35_1 Dis-satisfaction with democracy in the NL	.69			.59				.67	.68			-	-
V38_10 Income differences should be reduced			.82	.33	-.61	-.60	.41		-.36	.76		.68	
V41_10 Ethnic minorities – adjust to Dutch culture	.83			.79	.75				.80			.61	
V43_10 Send back as many asylum seekers as possible	.81			.81	.77				.81			-	-
V42_11 European unification has gone too far	.40			-	-	.34	.49			.55		.51	
V47_4 Political cynicism score	.78			.71		.78	.78					.76	
V48_6 External political efficacy score	-.74			-.77		-.70	-.78					-.75	
V49_4 Internal political efficacy score			-.61	-.45			-.81			-.51		-.66	
Variance explained by 1 st PC	29.1			31.0		28.2			29.1			30.1	

Note: Varimax rotated factors. Loadings above .33 shown.

According to the presented findings, the included populist attitudes do not represent a single coherent ideological dimension. However, in line with the ‘thin centered ideology’ view, it proved possible to isolate a relatively content-less political alienation dimension, which includes anti-elite attitudes.

The next question is how the thin core and the more substantive attitudes relate to preferences for populist and mainstream political parties.

Populist Attitudes and Party Preferences

If populist attributes are to be regarded as useful for understanding political preferences, they should be able to contribute to their explanation *in addition* to the more conventional and traditional explanatory models. I use the term traditional explanatory models to refer to a model that includes basic socio-structural factors that provide ground for traditional political divisions (e.g. social cleavage politics), and the traditional ideological division between the left and the right.

The following tables present the results of multivariate regression analyses, where the variables are entered in two blocks. The first block represents the traditional politics – socio-structural variables plus the left-right ideological orientation. Variables representing the ‘populist politics model’ are entered in the second step. Unless the expanded model explains significantly more variance than the basic model, there is not much reason to argue that populist ideology is consequential for mass political preferences.

Left-wing populism

Table 3 displays the results where preference for the Socialist Party is regressed onto the predictor variables. For each study year, Model 1 includes variables representing the traditional social-cleavage politics and the left-right ideology. Model 2 represents the populist politics view, where, in addition to the previous variables, populist attributes are added.

First to be noted is that both models are statistically significant in each year. Thus, populist attitudes significantly add to the understanding of party preferences (in this case for SP, but the same holds for all subsequently analysed parties and years).

By examining the R^2 change values we can also note that the weight of the ‘traditional politics’ variables is quite larger. The largest difference is observed in 2006, where the addition of the populism variables adds only 2 per cent of variance, while the traditional model alone explains a ten-fold proportion of variance.

Thus, although populist variables are important for understanding the preferences for SP, the conventional variables are much more important. Among these, the most influential is the left-right ideological identification. Although in many accounts populists try to present themselves as being above or beyond the traditional left-right division, this does not apply to the supporters of SP. They are clearly on the left wing. The addition of the populist attitudes reduces the impact of the L-R scale, but it remains the strongest single predictor of the SP support.

In addition, SP is consistently liked by younger respondents and in some surveys by the better educated and secular respondents. Lower income and social class are significant predictors in a single study each (2002 and 2003 respectively). The association with gender is significant in three out of four surveys. In 1998 and 2002 men felt more sympathetic towards SP, but the situation reversed in 2003. It may be that men moved to LPF in greater numbers, but further study is needed to establish a reliable explanation.

Sympathy towards SP is strongly and consistently associated with preference for economic redistribution. This could be interpreted as evidence of populism, but also as a result of economic egalitarianism being a key programmatic element of SP’s ideology. The second consistent relationship is with ethnocentric attitudes. However, the association is in the opposite direction of what the theory of general populism would suggest because

the sympathy towards SP is associated with *lower* ethnocentrism. More significantly, populist flavour of sympathies towards SP is contradicted by the fact that coefficients for the political alienation variables (including the ‘populist core’ of anti-elite orientation) failed to reach statistical significance. Moreover, sympathy towards SP is associated with *higher* sense of internal political efficacy. The link is weak and inconsistent (insignificant in 2002 and 2003), but it still suggests that the key attribute of populism does not fit very well with the attitudes of those who sympathize this party.

Table 3. Comparison of traditional and ‘populist politics’ models over time: Preference for SP

	1998		2002		2003		2006	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
D2 Age of respondent	-.07**	-.10***	-.07**	-.06*	-.13***	-.14***	-.04*	-.06**
D1 Sex of respondent (Female)	-.08**	-.07**	-.07**	-.08**	.09***	.08**	.00	.01
D37 Highest education (completed) of respondent	.09**	.04	.14***	.12***	.08**	.05	.09***	.05*
D43 Social class – self image	.04	.04	-.02	-.02	.06*	.06*	.02	.03
D47 Respondent’s attendance of religious services	-.03	-.04	-.03	-.03	.02	.00	-.07**	-.07***
D49 Net annual income of respondent’s household	-.05	-.03	-.07*	-.05*	-.05	-.02	.00	.00
V46_1 Left-right self-rating (1 st wave)	-.35***	-.27***	-.39***	-.30***	-.50***	-.38***	-.41***	-.35***
V35_1 Dissatisfaction with democracy in the NL		.002		.001		.004		-.01
V35_2 Parties unnecessary for functioning of democracy		-.03		.00		-.02		-
V38_10 Income differences should be reduced		.09***		.13***		.16***		.10***
V39_8 The government should act tougher on crime		-		.02		-		-.04
V41_10 Ethnic minorities – adjust to Dutch culture		-.05		-.12***		-.02		-.03
V43_10 Send back as many asylum seekers as possible		-.13***		-.04		-.11***		-.05*
V42_11 European unification has gone too far		.04		.04		-		.03
V47_4 Political cynicism score		.05		.04		-.01		-.01
V48_6 External political efficacy score		-.04		.01		.02		.00
V49_4 Internal political efficacy score		.07*		.05		.00		.08***
R ² Change	.15	.04	.20	.03	.30	.04	.21	.02
R ² Total		.19		.23		.34		.23

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Note: Table entries: Standardized regression coefficients.

In 2006, the left-right scale comes from the post-election wave.

Model 1: Traditional politics – social-cleavage and left-right ideology variables

Model 2: Populist politics model

Right-wing populism

Table 4 compares the traditional and populist politics models for LPF. In this case, the traditional politics seems also more relevant. The explained variance is higher for Model 1 in all three years. However, the *difference* in two years is larger than what was observed for SP. The largest difference is in 2002 – the explained variance increased by a remarkable 14 per cent when the populist variables were added to the model. Thus, at least when LPF was at its peak, the relative weight of the elements of populist ideology is greater than for SP. At the same time, there is no clear difference in the degree to which sympathies towards LPF and SP are associated with variables from the traditional politics model. In other words, the traditional model works similarly for LPF and for SP, but the populist variables have a relatively stronger impact.¹²

Among the socio-demographic variables, sympathy towards LPF is associated with younger age, as is the case with SP. The strongest association is also with the left-right ideology, but, expectedly, it goes in the opposite direction. There are very few additional significant associations in this block.

There are, however, strong and consistent associations with the ‘populist bloc’ of variables. The strongest relationship is observed for the ethnocentrism variables, especially concerning the preference for sending back the asylum seekers. In 2002, this variable has the highest coefficient in the model.

The remaining significant associations are weaker and not consistent over years. Thus, in 2002, LPF sympathy was associated with dissatisfaction with democracy and authoritarianism – both frequently mentioned as attributes of right-wing populism.

The most important and the least expected result is that the ‘populist core’ variables, primarily external political efficacy (subsuming the anti-elite attitude), but also political cynicism, are not associated with preference for LPF. In 2002, the LPF sympathy was associated with lower internal efficacy, but this orientation does not involve references to the people vs. elite division. Thus, the populist core does not contribute to explaining preference for LPF once the traditional politics variables and ethnocentrism are controlled for.

¹² There is also a clear trend of decreasing level of total variance explained. Perhaps the support for this party has become more idiosyncratic over the years, as the party has moved into political background.

Table 4. Comparison of traditional and 'populist politics' models over time: Preference for LPF

	2002		2003		2006	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
D2 Age of respondent	-.08 **	-.11 ***	-.08 **	-.08 **	-.19 ***	-.18 ***
D1 Sex of respondent (Female)	-.11 ***	-.09 ***	-.05	-.05	.03	.02
D37 Highest education (completed) of respondent	-.06 *	-.02	-.06 *	-.01	-.05	.001
D43 Social class – self image	-.05	-.05	.001	-.02	.04	.01
D47 Respondent's attendance of religious services	-.04	-.03	.02	.02	-.07 **	-.06 **
D49 Net annual income of respondent's household	-.05	-.03	.01	.004	-.03	-.03
V46_1 Left-right self-rating (1 st wave)	.39 ***	.20 ***	.46 ***	.31 ***	.17 ***	.11 ***
V35_1 Dissatisfaction with democracy in the NL		.09 ***		.01		.03
V35_2 Parties unnecessary for functioning of democracy		.03		-.01		-
V38_10 Income differences should be reduced		-.04		-.02		.02
V39_8 The government should act tougher on crime		.05 *		-		.003
V41_10 Ethnic minorities – adjust to Dutch culture		.06 *		.13 ***		.06 *
V43_10 Send back as many asylum seekers as possible		.29 ***		.18 ***		.15 ***
V42_11 European unification has gone too far		.03		-		-.02
V47_4 Political cynicism score		.04		.01		.01
V48_6 External political efficacy score		-.05		.001		.05
V49_4 Internal political efficacy score		.04		-.01		-.07 **
R ² Change	.18	.14	.22	.06	.06	.03
R ² Total		.32		.28		.09

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Note: Table entries: Standardized regression coefficients.

In 2006, the left-right scale and sympathy score for LPF come from the post-election wave.

Model 1: Traditional social-cleavage and left-right ideology variables

Model 2: Populist politics model

Further evidence for the right-wing populism can be sought among several other parties that participated in fewer elections in the covered period. Table 5 shows the findings for the following three parties: Centrumdemocraten, Leefbaar Netherlands, and PVV.

The picture is, in several respects, similar to the one described for LPF. Supporters of these parties tend to be relatively young and to identify with the right-wing. Unlike the LPF case, support for these parties seems to be more widespread among those with lower education (PVV and CD) and lower income (CD in 1998 and LN). Thus, the right-wing populism is associated with lower social strata – in some of its manifestations, as suggested by Pauwels (2010). LPF sympathies definitely do not share the lower social strata bias.

Table 5. Comparison of traditional and 'populist politics' models over time: Preference for additional right-wing parties

	Centrumdemocraten				Leefbaar Nederland		PVV	
	1994		1998		2002		2006	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
D2 Age of respondent	-.16 ***	-.19 ***	-.12 ***	-.14 ***	-.17 ***	-.19 ***	-.15 ***	-.17 ***
D1 Sex of respondent	-.03	-.01	.01	.02	-.04	-.04	-.03	-.04
D37 Highest education (completed) of respondent	-.12 ***	-.06	-.14 ***	-.09 **	-.05	-.01	-.15 ***	-.07 **
D43 Social class – self image	.06	.06	.05	.02	.01	-	.04	-.02
D47 Respondent's attendance of religious services	-.03	-.03	.01	.03	-.04	-.04	-.09 ***	-.07 ***
D49 Net annual income of respondent's household	-.01	-.02	-.07 *	-.07 *	-.08 **	-.06 *	-.04 *	-.03
V46_1 Left-right self-rating (1 st wave)	.17 ***	.09 **	.15 ***	.10 ***	.24 ***	.11 ***	.35 ***	.24 ***
V35_1 Dissatisfaction with democracy in the NL		-		.10 ***		-.02		.08 ***
V35_2 Parties unnecessary for functioning of democracy		-		.07 **		.02		-
V38_10 Income differences should be reduced		-.08 **		.03		-.02		-.01
V39_8 The government should act tougher on crime		.01		-		.08 **		.06 **
V41_10 Ethnic minorities – adjust to Dutch culture		.15 ***		.05		.02		.12 ***
V43_10 Send back as many asylum seekers as possible		-		.13 ***		.22 ***		.18 ***
V42_11 European unification has gone too far		-.01		-.02		-.03		.04 *
V47_4 Political cynicism score		.12 ***		.00		.05		.01
V48_6 External political efficacy score		-.06		-.06		-.05		-.03
49_4 Internal political efficacy score		.03		.00		-.05		-.04
R ² Change	.07	.06	.07	.05	.09	.08	.16	.10
R ² Total		.12		.12		.17		.26

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Note: Table entries: Standardized regression coefficients.

In 2006, the left-right scale and sympathy score for PVV come from the post-election wave.

Model 1: Traditional social-cleavage and left-right ideology variables

Model 2: Populist politics model

The comparison of the change in the explained variance between the two models also shows more similarity with LPF than with SP. Generally, the differences in favour of the traditional model are smaller than in the case of SP. In other words, the populist variables are more important for preferences on the right-wing variety of populism. Among these variables, ethnocentrism is again the most consistent predictor, especially for PVV.

Additionally, sympathy towards CD (1998) and PVV are associated with dissatisfaction with Dutch democracy and authoritarianism (PVV and LN). However, the key attribute of anti-elite orientation (within external efficacy scale) is lacking again. Thus, the sympathies towards the radical right-wing parties in the Netherlands, despite the usual labelling, do not appear to require the 'thin core of populism' in order to be explained. The traditional politics variables with added ethnocentrism and some authoritarianism and dissatisfaction seem to be sufficient.

The mainstream parties

The results for sympathies towards the Labour Party (PvdA) are presented in Table 6. The comparison of the variance explained by the two models shows that the difference in favour of traditional politics is more pronounced than in the case of the right-wing parties. Again, the most influential is the left-right identification. In addition, and not surprisingly, PvdA support is widespread among the lower-class, and in some cases, less educated and secular respondents. The association with age varies. In 1994, older respondents liked PvdA more, but in the later studies, the association reversed, though its magnitude is not very high.

Various 'populist' attitudes contribute to PvdA preferences. As expected, supporters of the Labour Party are consistently in favour of reducing income differences, but that cannot be taken as populist in this case. PvdA sympathisers are also more than averagely satisfied with Dutch democracy. In this case, some of the insignificant associations are interesting as well. Ethnocentrism variables are consistently unrelated to PvdA preferences, suggesting that supporters of this party remained quite immune to this issue. A weak negative association is observed only in 2002.

Concerning the populist core, cynicism is pretty consistently negatively associated, but the most direct measure of abstract populism, external efficacy, is weakly positively associated in two out of five elections studies (the negative association with internal efficacy is a deviant case).

Support for CDA (Table 7) also shows features expected from a mainstream party. The variance explained by the traditional politics model is consistently much higher than the additional variance accounted for by the populist attitudes. Likewise, the key traditional divisions are clearly outlined: CDA supporters identify with the right wing and come from the religious sections of the society. Less clearly and consistently, support for CDA is associated with older age (2003), higher social class self-identification (2006), and education (1998).

Table 6. Comparison of traditional and 'populist politics' models over time: Preference for PvdA

	1994		1998		2002		2003		2006	
	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
D2 Age of respondent	.08**	.11***	.00	.04	-.09***	-.05*	-.08**	-.06*	-.06**	-.05*
D1 Sex of respondent	.03	.02	.04	.04	.04	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01
D37 Highest education (completed) of respondent	-.01	-.07*	-.03	-.05	.00	-.02	-.02	-.05	-.01	-.03
D43 Social class – self image	.05	.05	.05	.09**	.07*	.07*	.06	.06	.06**	.08**
D47 Respondent's attendance of religious services	.05	.04	-.03	-.03	-.01	-.03	-.01	-.04	-.05**	-.07**
D49 Net annual income of respondent's household	.00	.01	.02	.01	.01	.00	.01	.01	.01	.01
V46_1 Left-right self-rating (1 st wave)	-.38***	-.30***	-.32***	-.28***	-.35***	-.23***	-.47***	-.42***	-.42***	-.38***
V35_1 Dissatisfaction with democracy in the NL				-.15***		-.18***		-.10***		-.06**
V35_2 Parties unnecessary for functioning of democracy				-.08***		-.03		-.02		
V38_10 Income differences should be reduced		.11***		.06*		.09**		.08**		.11***
V39_8 The government should act tougher on crime		-.04				-.04				.03
V41_10 Ethnic minorities – adjust to Dutch culture		-.10***		-.03		-.03		.00		-.02
V43_10 Send back as many asylum seekers as possible				.01		-.06*		-.04		-.01
V42_11 European unification has gone too far		-.07**		-.12***		-.08**				-.06**
V47_4 Political cynicism score		-.10***		-.10***		-.11***		-.07*		-.04
V48_6 External political efficacy score		.07*		.02		.00		.07*		.03
V49_4 Internal political efficacy score		-.01		-.02		-.05		-.06*		.02
R ² Change	.15	.06	.12	.08	.14	.09	.24	.04	.20	.03
R ² Total		.21		.20		.23		.28		.23

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Note: Table entries: Standardized regression coefficients.

In 2006, the left-right scale comes from the post-election wave.

Model 1: Traditional social-cleavage and left-right ideology variables

Model 2: Populist politics model

CDA and PvdA supporters are also similar in the acceptance of the political system, and in lower political alienation. CDA sympathies also go together with preference for income inequality and political authoritarianism, which fits their programmatic orientation.

Finally, CDA sympathies are generally not associated with the ethnocentrism variables (except for the one coefficient in 2003 – which is in the ethnocentric direction, contrary to the one observed for PvdA). This further supports the interpretation that the established parties (i.e. their supporters) did not have clear preferences along this dimension, which provided a niche for the new right-wing parties to exploit.

Table 7. Comparison of traditional and 'populist politics' models over time: Preference for CDA

	1998		2003		2006	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
D2 Age of respondent	.00	.04	.04	.07 *	-.02	.04
D1 Sex of respondent	.03	.02	.05	.05	.01	.01
D37 Highest education (completed) of respondent	-.09 **	-.09 **	.02	.02	.01	.00
D43 Social class – self image	-.02	.00	.00	.00	-.09 ***	-.05 *
D47 Respondent's attendance of religious services	.21 ***	.20 ***	.10 ***	.08 **	.08 ***	.06 **
D49 Net annual income of respondent's household	.03	.02	.02	.00	.02	.00
V46_1 Left-right self-rating (1 st wave)	.18 ***	.19 ***	.48 ***	.41 ***	.43 ***	.38 ***
V35_1 Dissatisfaction with democracy in the NL		-.08 **		-		-.13 ***
V35_2 Parties necessary for functioning of democracy		-.04		-.03		
V38_10 Income differences should be reduced		-.02		-.06 *		-.07 ***
V39_8 The government should act tougher on crime						.06 **
V41_10 Ethnic minorities – adjust to Dutch culture		-.01		.09 **		.00
V43_10 Send back as many asylum seekers as possible		.00		.02		.02
V42_11 European unification has gone too far		-.11 ***				-.05 *
V47_4 Political cynicism score		-.09 **		-.06 *		-.08 ***
V48_6 External political efficacy score		.02		.05		.11 ***
V49_4 Internal political efficacy score		-.08 **		-.07 *		-.08 ***
R ² Change	.10	.04	.25	.04	.23	.06
R ² Total		.14		.29		.29

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Note: Table entries: Standardized regression coefficients.

In 2006, the left-right scale comes from the post-election wave.

Model 1: Traditional social-cleavage and left-right ideology variables

Model 2: Populist politics model

FINAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The interrelationships between the populist attributes were approached through the analysis of attitude dimensionality. The evidence suggests that the structural features are stable over time, and that attitudes commonly associated with various brands of populism act like several relatively independent dimensions rather than as a coherent ideological structure, which is in line with the view that the populist core needs to be combined with more substantive ideologies (Canovan, 2002; Stanley, 2008).

Principal component analysis of attitudes associated with populism – left and/or right – showed that the 'populist core' attitudes (anti-elite orientation, alienation, and cynicism) tend to co-vary with ethnocentrism, but not with economic egalitarianism. Thus, this seems to be an evidence of the

existence of ethnocentric populism in the Netherlands. This image is consistent over five election studies.

When a broader set of attitudes is examined, three core orientations are apparent in the isolated factors. One revolves around political alienation, the sense of distance from the political regime, and *distrust in political elites*, i.e. an orientation close to the theoretical populist core (Akkerman et al., 2013; Mudde 2004; Stanley, 2008). Ethnocentrism is another clearly discernible dimension, sometimes close to Euro-scepticism, and sometimes to economic inegalitarianism. Economic attitude is related to the other two orientations but does not really represent a core element of any of them, and is therefore better seen as a separate dimension. The isolation of a relatively content-less political alienation dimension (the first rotated factor, which includes anti-elite attitudes) supports the ‘thin centered ideology’ view of populism, and Akkerman et al.’s (2013) factorial definition of populist orientation.

On the surface, the conclusion that the included populist attitudes do not represent a single coherent ideological dimension differs from Rooduijn’s conclusions (2014). However, he deals with right-wing populism, and the results presented here clearly indicate an affinity between the populist core and ethnocentrism – a trademark combination of the radical right populism.

Concerning the party preferences, the results showed that, regardless of whether left-populist, right-populist, or mainstream, traditional politics model explains more variance than the entire set of populist attributes. However, the populist attitudes add significantly to the explanatory power, particularly in case of the radical right-wing parties. This piece of evidence corroborates the literature that finds populism mostly on the (radical) right wing (e.g. Betz, 1993; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn, 2014).

Although LPF support has some roots in traditional social and ideological divisions as younger right-wing identifiers exhibit more sympathies towards this party, the defining issue is the attitude towards immigrants. Significantly, once the model controls for the ‘traditional politics’ variables *and* ethnocentrism, the populist ‘core’ (political alienation variables, including the anti-elite attitudes within the external efficacy dimension) proves unassociated with LPF preference. Thus, while the general picture is close to the usual descriptions of LPF support (Belanger & Aarts, 2006), it appears that it can be painted without the shades of the ‘populist core’ ideology. The populist nature of LPF support, outlined in Akkerman et al. (2013) and Rooduijn (2014) may be due to different operationalizations of populist orientations, but most likely due to the lack of control variables.

Anti-immigrant attitude also characterizes the remaining radical right-wing parties (Centrumdemocraten, LN, and PVV). While dissatisfaction with politics characterizes sympathies towards these parties, including anti-party sentiments, it does not apply to variables closer to the core of populism (here external efficacy).

Support for the SP proved to have strong roots in traditional social and political cleavages. Concerning the populist attitudes, there are essentially two consistent features. One is preference for economic egalitarianism, and the other is *tolerant* attitude towards immigrants and asylum seekers. The former association can be interpreted as a programmatic feature of SP. The latter makes it clearly a part of the radical right-wing populism, both in the Netherlands, and across Europe (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Perhaps more interestingly, it seems that SP supporters lack the sense of political alienation and anti-elite sentiment that Mudde, Stanley, Canovan, and others find to be the core element of populism, and that Mudde ascribes specifically to SP (Mudde, 2004; March and Mudde, 2005; Akkerman et al., 2013).

While the left-right identification proved to be the strongest predictor of each party preference included in the analysis, virtually nothing was found that would unite populist supporters on the left and the right side. Apparently, much of the party competition in the Netherlands can still be seen as arranged along the left-right dimension, rather than as the opposition between the new populists and mainstream parties. The new right-wing parties seem to have brought a new issue to the centre of political debate, but they seem to be perceived as still being positioned along the same line. The comparison with the established parties corroborates this interpretation. Sympathies towards SP and PvdA have a similar profile in most respects, just as the right-wing mainstream and 'populist' parties show similarities on the other side.

However, there is one important difference between the mainstream and the right-wing populist parties. It is the fact that the support for the mainstream parties is associated with the positive attitude towards the political regime (satisfaction with democracy, sense of efficacy, low cynicism). These associations are generally negative (satisfaction) or insignificant (alienation) for the right-wing populist parties. Instead of showing that political alienation (including the perception of 'people vs. elite' opposition) defines sympathies towards populist parties, the results showed that sympathies towards the mainstream parties are associated with higher efficacy. Sympathies towards SP are even *positively* associated with internal political efficacy.

Overall, there seems to be little evidence of a coherent populist ideology consisting of the familiar attributes such as political alienation, ethnocentrism, economic egalitarianism, and Euroscepticism. The findings suggest that, in Dutch public opinion, populism equals right-wing populism as far as the structure of ideology is concerned. Concerning party preferences, the results showed that, if appropriate controls for traditional politics are introduced, the thin ideological core of populism can be left out of the model. It is ethnocentrism that appears to be the ideological core of the parties labelled radical right populist. Economic egalitarianism and ethnic tolerance characterize the support for the allegedly populist left-wing SP. To summarize, there is no evidence for the existence of a more general,

substantively grounded populist ideology, only for the thin populist core, containing various indicators of political alienation, including anti-elite orientation. Second, no support is found for the claim that anti-elite ‘core’ is a common ideological ground that unites supporters of the left and the right wing populist parties. Finally, the ‘thin ideological core’ of populism proved inconsequential for understanding party preferences in the Netherlands, whether populist-labelled or otherwise.

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APPENDIX

V47_4 Political cynicism score

Three variables operationalize political cynicism. The Political cynicism score (V47_4; range: 0 – 3) was established by counting the three ‘positive’ responses to questions V47_1, V47_2, and V47_3.

Variable	Question text:	Codes of ‘positive’ responses
V47_1	<i>Although they know better, politicians promise more than they can deliver.</i>	Fully agree and Agree
V47_2	<i>Ministers and state secretaries are primarily concerned about their personal interests.</i>	Fully agree and Agree
V47_3	<i>One is more likely to become a member of parliament because of one’s political friends than because of one’s abilities.</i>	Fully agree and Agree

V48_6 External political efficacy score

Five variables measure external political efficacy. The External political efficacy score (V48_6; range: 0 – 5) was established by counting the ‘positive’ responses to questions V48_1 to V48_5.

Variable	Question text:	Codes of ‘positive’ responses
V48_1	<i>Members of parliament do not care about the opinions of people like me.</i>	Disagree / Not true
V48_2	<i>Political parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinions.</i>	Disagree / Not true
V48_3	<i>People like me have absolutely no influence on governmental policy.</i>	Disagree / Not true
V48_4	<i>So many people vote in elections that my vote does not matter.</i>	Disagree / Not true
V48_5	<i>Usually our representatives in the Second Chamber quickly lose contact with the people in the country.</i>	Disagree / Not true

V49_4 Internal political efficacy score

Three variables deal with internal political efficacy. The Internal political efficacy score (V49_4; range: 0 – 3) was established by counting the ‘positive’ responses to questions V49_1, V49_2, and V49_3.

Variable	Label	Codes of ‘positive’ responses
V49_1	<i>I am well qualified to play an active role in politics.</i>	Fully agree and Agree
V49_2	<i>I have a good understanding of the important political problems in our country.</i>	Fully agree and Agree
V49_3	<i>Sometimes politics seems so complicated that people like me cannot really understand what is going on.</i>	Disagree, Fully disagree

НЕУХВАТЉИВА СУШТИНА ПОПУЛИЗМА: СТРУКТУРА ПОПУЛИСТИЧКЕ ИДЕОЛОГИЈЕ У ХОЛАНДИЈИ

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Резиме

У раду се анализира у којој мери јавно мњење Холандије показује елементе организоване идеолошке структуре која би се могла назвати популистичком. У литератури се уз популизам најчешће везују идеолошке одреднице као што су национализам, етноцентризам (десничарски популизам), као и економски егалитаријанизам (левичарски популизам). Том виђењу је супротстављена теорија по којој популизам нема сталне идеолошке одреднице, осим ‘танке идеолошке сржи’ која се састоји у анти-елитизму, и сродним формама политичке алијенације (Akkerman et al., 2013; Mudde 2004). Тај став изражава виђење политичког света у којем су манихејски супротстављени корумпиране елите и ‘народ’. Заступници овог виђења сматрају да тај став карактерише популизам како левице тако и деснице. Циљ овог рада је, да се утврди адекватност наведених теорија. Холандија је погодан пример за истраживање наведеног проблема јер су се у новијој историји јављале политичке партије које се сматрају популистичким на обе стране политичког спектрума.

У првом делу рада се испитују релације између неколико кључних атрибута популизма - етноцентризма, економског егалитаријанизма и анти-елитизма. Циљ је да се утврди да ли ти атрибути конвергирају ка општијој популистичкој идеологији. У другом делу рада се анализира додатна експланаторна вредност када се популистички атрибути као предиктори партијских преференција додају варијаблима које чине стандардни модел политичке подршке. На тај начин се пореде идеолошки профили симпатизера популистичких партија на супротним странама политичког спектрума међусобно, и са профилима симпатизера традиционалних политичких партија.

Емпиријску основу за проучавање наведених проблема представљају подаци истраживања јавног мњења у Холандији. Подаци су прикупљени у вези са парламентарним изборима од 1994. до 2006. године, на репрезентативним националним узорцима пунолетних испитаника.

Резултати факторске анализе не подржавају идеју о постојању општије, супстантивно засноване популистичке идеологије. Међутим, изолована је димензија која одговара 'танкој суштини' популизма, која се састоји од индикатора политичке алијенације, анти-елинизма и политичког цинизма. Такође се показало да та димензија конвергира са етноцентризмом ка заједничкој димензији. Економски егалитаријанизам формира посебну димензију, и не корелира са 'популистичком сржи'. Дакле, с обзиром на идеолошку садржину, тј. улогу етноцентризма, популизам се у јавном мењу Холандије јавља у десничарској форми. Подаци не подржавају виђење да је анти-елинизам идеолошка суштина заједничка за левичарски и десничарски популизам.

Што се тиче предикције партијских преференција, показало се да традиционални експланаторни модел (демографске и социјално-економске варијабле, плус идентификација са левицом/десницом) објашњава више варијансе него сви укључени популистички атрибути заједно. Ипак, они значајно доприносе предикцији партијских преференција, посебно у случају десничарских (популистичких) партија.

Од посебног значаја је то што се 'танка суштина популизма' показала као статистички небитна за разумевање партијских преференција у Холандији, било за партије које се сматрају популистичким било за традиционалне партије, када се у моделу контролише утицај варијабли традиционалне политике и етноцентризма. Што се тиче левичарског популизма, став према наводно популистичкој Социјалистичкој партији (СП) повезан је са етничком толеранцијом, економским егалитаријанизмом, док није у вези са 'идеолошком сржи' популизма - анти-елинизмом и политичком алијенацијом.