

RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AS A(N) (IM)POSSIBLE MODEL FOR THE POST-YUGOSLAV AREA

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Abstract

The concept of reconciliation as a political-psychological concept came into being at the beginning of the nineties of the last century. It took a lot of time for the experts, who were engaged in peacebuilding in the post-conflict period, to understand that political, economic and other social processes were not sufficient for the reconciliation process, but that psychological aspects of reconciliation should also be included. In such a way, the process of reconciliation, in which subjects of reconciliation are race, people, nations, was lowered from the collective to the individual level. An example of such an attempt relates to the events after the apartheid in the South African Republic and the establishment of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. In this regard, this paper aims to identify the basic ideas and principles of the reconciliation process in the South African Republic and try to place it in the context of reconciliation between formerly warring parties in the former Yugoslavia. In the analysis of the concept of reconciliation that has been relatively successfully applied in the South African Republic, three key ideas have been identified. The first idea suggests that the process of reconciliation from the level of "political elites" should be lowered to the level of "ordinary people". The second, it is necessary to have a so-called Third party for the reconciliation process that will manage the whole process. And the third, that the truth is an unavoidable factor in the process of reconciliation. In this paper, a proposal for a possible model of reconciliation among the countries and nations of the former Yugoslavia is given on the basis of analysis of the post-conflict processes in the South African Republic and current events in the post-Yugoslav space.

Key words: South African Republic, Post-Yugoslav area, Reconciliation, Third Party, Truth.

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ПОМИРЕЊЕ У ЈУЖНОАФРИЧКОЈ РЕПУБЛИЦИ КАО (НЕ)МОГУЋИ МОДЕЛ ПОМИРЕЊА НА ПОСТЈУГОСЛОВЕНСКОМ ПРОСТОРУ

Апстракт

Концепт помирења као политичко-психолошки концепт настао је почетком деведесетих година прошлог века. Дуго је требало стручњацима који су се бавили изградњом мира у постконфликтном периоду да схвате да политички, економски и други друштвени процеси нису довољни за процес помирења, већ да је потребно укључити и психолошке аспекте помирења. Тиме је процес помирења са колективног, у коме су субјекти помирења раса, народ и нација, спуштен на индивидуални ниво. Пример једног таквог покушаја односи се на догађаје након апартејда у Јужноафричкој републици и формирање Комисије за истину и помирење. С тим у вези, овај рад има за циљ да идентификује основне идеје и принципе процеса помирења у Јужноафричкој републици и покуша да исте постави у контекст помирења између некада зараћених страна на простору бивше Југославије. У анализи самог концепта помирења који је релативно успешно примењиван у Јужноафричкој републици, идентификоване су три кључне идеје. Прва идеја указује на чињеницу да процес помирења са нивоа „политичких елита“ треба спустити на ниво „обичних грађана“. Друга, да је за процес помирења потребна тзв. *трећа* страна која ће управљати читавим процесом. И као трећа, да је истина незаобилазан фактор у процесу помирења. Дакле, у овом раду дат је предлог могућег модела помирења међу државама и народима бивше Југославије на основу анализе постконфликтних процеса у Јужноафричкој републици и тренутних дешавања на постјугословенском простору.

Кључне речи: Јужноафричка република, постјугословенски простор, помирење, трећа страна, истина.

INTRODUCTION

Philosophical, religious and psychological discourses have tried to understand the nature of war and modalities of stopping conflicts since antiquity. Saint Augustine and Spinoza spoke in that manner when they said that man is the root of evil and thus responsible for the evil of war (Petrović, 2005). Similar to them, Hobbess (2004) argued that when there is no supreme authority, such as the state, then people are in their natural state that “we call war, and that is the war of all against all,”. Clausewitz (von Klauzevic, 1951) wrote that war is an act of force that barely has any limit. Fromm considered that most of the wars were not caused by aggravated aggression, but by the interests of political and military forces (Petrović, 2005), and psychological experiments such as Asch's experiment on conformity, Milgram's experiment on obedience to authority figures and Zimbard's prison experiment, helped to understand to a certain degree the "dark side" of human behavior.

However, understanging war and the nature of human evil was deprived of answers to a number of questions, among which was not only the one of how wars may be stopped, but also how to build peace between

warring parties. Namely, the problem is that for most people peace means victory, the victory of their side (Coker, 2010). It is a fact that it required much time to understand that stopping a war and signing the ceasefire did not necessarily mean the creation of a lasting and stable peace, especially not for ethnic and national groups that were "condemned" to live together. This is testified by numerous experiences after the conflicts, as illustrated by the relations between Israel and Palestine, between ethnic and religious communities in the former Yugoslavia, events in Rwanda and South Africa, etc. In this regard, some authors have seen a solution to this problem in the idea of formulating a new theoretical concept - the concept of reconciliation.

The first reconciliation studies emerged during the 1990s (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004), and it can safely be said that they were spurred by the events in South Africa after the apartheid period. Namely, the unconventional idea of Nelson Mandela to reconcile victims and perpetrators before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has prompted many theorists to move the issue of reconciliation from the "political arena" and place it within the framework of other scientific and social disciplines. Previous practices have confirmed that many intractable conflicts have denied the view that political, economic, security and structural factors alone can solve long-standing and violent conflicts (Wilmer, 1998). Perhaps Petrovic (2005) gives the best explanation when he says that political and social systems are not *sui generis*, that they do not exist outside the individuals who make them, nor function without human dynamics. Therefore, in order to understand war and its ending, it is not enough just to understand the political, but also the psychological context, because in the preamble of the UNESCO Statute it is stated: "Since wars begin in the minds of people, it is in the minds of people that the defence of peace must be constructed."¹

In this regard, this paper aims to consider the reconciliation process as a political-psychological issue and to extract the basic ideas of reconciliation from the model of reconciliation in South Africa and consider their applicability in the context of reconciliation on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Although it was believed that the process of reconciliation would be simpler because the conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia were aimed at creating ethnically homogeneous states and thus reducing the threats from national minorities (Penev, 2012), current events show that the process of reconciliation has not yet been completed and that everything might have been simple, but not the reconciliation. Therefore, the search for new models of reconciliation, as applied in the South African Republic, can represent a new initiation for the common and peaceful life of ethnic communities in former Yugoslavia.

¹ See http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/UNESCO_E.PDF.

Bearing in mind that the model of reconciliation in South Africa is complex and therefore its consideration cannot be comprehensive, this paper will focus on three key ideas that characterize this model: (1) From the contact of the "ordinary people" to reconciliation, (2) The Third party - a necessary factor of reconciliation and (3) From truth to reconciliation.

*FROM THE CONTACT OF THE "ORDINARY PEOPLE"
TO RECONCILIATION*

After the end of the apartheid, the South African society was seeking its path to national reconciliation. After a lengthy parliamentary debate (more than 300 hours of parliamentary session) and numerous consultations conducted with representatives of human rights organizations, associations of victims and survivors, their families, all church communities, academics and the general public, the parliament passed the decree by which it appointed Truth and Reconciliation Commission (in the further text: Commission).

As a national instrument, the Commission was aimed at implementing the idea of a policy of amnesty and collective apology at the level of the local community, i.e. at bringing reconciliation to "ordinary people". This state's approach "from the top to the bottom" is based on the belief that national intervention is necessary for changes in the local community (Bloomfield, Barnes & Huyse, 2003), but that there should be such an intervention that will enable the victim and the perpetrator to meet, which will further lead to reconciliation. Giving responsibility to victims and perpetrators in the process of national reconciliation is a movement towards Lederah's organic view of reconciliation in which the energy of the system is focused on finding ways to involve and inspire many people to feel their own responsibility and importance (Petrović, 2005). That is also supported by the fact that this contact must happen in the local community because changes in the local community are necessary, since the main function of the community is to mediate between the individual and society (Ajduković, 2003). Without a functional local community, the individual is alienated from the state, and then the society falls apart (Durkheim, 1964 in Ajduković, 2003).

Post-war and conflict circumstances leave, at the foundations of a divided community, serious psychological consequences, such as massive traumatization and huge personal and collective losses, disturbing self-esteem and self-image, etc. Therefore, bearing in mind that community has not only territorial, but also psychological and social characteristics (Ajduković, 2003), it was necessary to create conditions for the direct contact of ordinary people in order to recover the communities in South Africa. Namely, it is not enough for people to live side by side, but among the residents there must be a sense of belonging to that community, i.e. people must be emotionally attached to it (Ajduković, 2003). So, in order to solve this "large-scale

problem", it was not enough that the South African aspiration of peace was considered only and exclusively in political circles, because, as Bloomfield and colleagues (Bloomfield et al., 2003) claim, although the work of politicians is vital to the transformation of the situation from the existing conflict to future peace, the greatest effort will be undermined if disrupted community relations are not taken into account. Moreover, political processes must leave room for other processes, including psychological (e.g. healing, ending of a grieving process, overcoming negative feelings, etc.).

However, it is difficult to imagine that reconciliation at the lower levels of society can come without the consent and will of political elites, especially those who actively exercise power. In the case of states that emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia, it can be seen that even after thirty years, the authorities continue, sometimes openly, and sometimes covertly, to propagate destructive nationalism, insisting on the specificities of their ethnic community, giving no space for the understanding of ethnic differences, and therefore giving no space for reconciliation itself. Manipulating fears and often referring to a one-sided interpretation of events from the past, the political, military, and religious elites were presenting themselves as the only protectors of "endangered national interests," which put reconciliation in the background and for some "better times". Holding their positions, both political and economic political elites² showed that they did not want true reconciliation, although they declared decisive support for it.

Since all the countries of the region are trying to or have already become full members of the Union, it can be expected that all of them fully support and implement the European Union's peace and values policy. However, some researches suggest that those who promote EU policies are at the same time the ones who sabotage the implementation of these same policies, through established informal networks at the local level (Adamović, Gvozdanić & Kovačić, 2017). In practice, this means that social elites, with the help of state apparatus and state resources, contrary to publicly expressed commitment to peace and reconciliation, do not allow reconciliation, obstructing even those initiatives and attempts that come from the local or individual levels.

An obvious example for the analysis of this situation in post-Yugoslav areas is an example from Bosnia and Herzegovina that refers to the deeply divided inter-ethnic community in Mostar. After so many years, the topic of the multiethnic division of Mostar into two parts - Croatian-Catholic and Bosniak-Muslim, does not cease to be a hot topic, and it is testified by the monograph by Gulia Carabelli from 2018 under

² The term "elite" is used in the context of classical theory, which implies that elites are an organized minority that necessarily possesses the means and mechanisms of power (Pavlović, 2012). When it comes to political elites, they conduct their power through the institutions of the state, for whose control they fight in the political game.

the title *The divided city and the grassroots*, as well as by numerous journalistic reports and articles from television and news agencies³. Observing the community of Mostar, Carabelli (2018) realizes that creating fear in a community, in which another ethnic community is seen as an enemy, is in fact nothing more than a political project that aims to deprive the ordinary people of political power and to maintain the separation of communities (social space of the city) in order to diminish the capacity for social connection.

This example of Mostar confirms the thesis that one of the main preconditions in the process of reconciliation has to be the political elite's abandonment of its own political projects defined at the time of the conflict and giving enough space to "ordinary people" to enter into contact. In support of this, there are also claims that on the path to peacebuilding there are (war and political) elites who want to retain their positions of power and privileges, but also to avoid responsibility for what had happened (Petrović, 2007). Only after the political elite has mastered its resistance to reconciliation, it could be possible, as Lederach (1997) says, to create physical and social space in which ordinary people will meet and develop their relations.

THE THIRD PARTY – A NECESSARY FACTOR OF RECONCILIATION

In the context of the reconciliation process in the South Africa, it was not enough to provide conditions for the contact of a victim and a perpetrator, but it was also important to manage this relationship in order to build mutual trust and understanding. In this respect, the Commission had to be, as Galtung (2001) called it, the Third Party. Namely, according to Galtung (2001), the Third Party is "above a victim and a perpetrator" and as a source of grace, law and justice, can have the form of: State (International Communities), God (Church) or Society (People). In essence, the Third party manages the relationship of the former warring parties (Galtung, 2001) and aims to facilitate, encourage and support reconciliation actions (Kriesberg, 2004).

In South Africa, the Commission as the Third Party was in the form of Church. Although it was a state instrument, the Christian principles and beliefs, on which its work was based, pointed to the fact that the hearing of the victim and the perpetrator resembled a confession rather than a judicial-criminal process. Therefore, the Commission was not a judicial body, and its aim was not to establish the perpetrators' guilt,

³ See video BBC: <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-44970561/is-mostar-still-a-divided-city>.

but to enforce the justice of compassion and peace, i.e. to promote reconciliation (Bloomfield et al., 2003). Although, at first glance, the functions and tasks of the Commission seemed easy, its work was delicate and complex. Analyzing the numerous activities that the Commission conducted (hearing the victim and perpetrators, informing the public, conducting investigations, giving a final report with recommendations, etc. (Bloomfield et al., 2003)), it could be said that the most difficult task was to be impartial in its work, i.e. not to be "the long arm of the victim's will," as this could lead to "the fiction of nationalism"⁴.

Apart from the bias in the work of the Commission, Bloomfield and colleagues (Bloomfield et al., 2003) cite other potential risks that may have adverse consequences, one of them being the establishment of the Commission with inadequate motives and unrealistic expectations of its work. These are not the risks for the Commission only, but for the Third Party in general. In this regard, Kriesberg (2004) states that reconciliation elements and activities could be carried out by those who are not involved in a destructive conflict, in a way that does not lead to the creation of a stable peace. In his view, in the context of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, such case is The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

In the territory of former Yugoslavia, from the the end of the nineties of the last century to the present time, it could be said that there were different forms of the Third Party, which had international character and which participated in the process of reconciliation, but which failed to stop the "war rhetoric" even among ethnic communities that existed in separate border entities. It is clear that the Third Party must represent some kind of authority in whose intentions the opposing parties will believe, and who will be able to manage a very sensitive and complex process of reconciliation. Therefore, the Third party should be accepted by all sides in the conflict, otherwise its work and results in the process of reconciliation, as well as the building of lasting peace, are condemned to failure.

The choice of the Third party depends on several factors, but one is definitely the type of conflict. It is not the same when the conflict is intra-state and when it is inter-state. In a process of reconciliation that takes place within the borders of one state, the Third Party can be formed under the influence of the state authority itself, without international participation. Such was the case with the Commission in South Africa. Contrary to this model, the reconciliation of conflicting states requires a Third Party that would not belong to any of the the conflicting parties, i.e. that would have

⁴ A fiction of nationalism is a phenomenon which takes place at the moments when ethnic minorities start feeling insecure because they believe that the ethnic majority will use its privileges to transform state institutions into instruments for ethnic dominance. (Ignatieff, 1998).

an international base. Thus, the European Union appears as the Third Party in the process of reconciliation after the conflict in former Yugoslavia, as well as the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague, and numerous non-governmental organizations. All of them, except perhaps some non-governmental organizations, had a role in the process of reconciliation at the political level.

The European Union, as a supra-state creation, was originally created as a peace project aimed at reconciling European states and nations after the Second World War, but also at preventing future conflicts. At the beginning, this process was developed through economic co-operation, and afterwards this co-operation was expanded into all spheres of social activity. The peacemaking character itself of the UN that is embedded at the basis of the values of its founding and existence, gives the European Union the legitimacy to be the Third Party in the process of reconciliation in the territory of former Yugoslavia. However, the structure of the European Union, the decision-making process and different, sometimes completely opposite interests of the Member States, represent limitations because of which the EU cannot be fully accomplished as a global player, nor, by extension, as a Third Party in peace processes. In addition, the influence of the European Union is quite limited, because by the so-called Policy Conditionality, it can have dominant impact only on those countries that are striving to become its members, while the impact on those countries that cannot or do not wish to become members of the Union, it is significantly weaker (Живковић & Миленковић, 2015).

It is precisely in the case of the European Union mediation between Belgrade and Pristina in the process of reconciliation, that all restrictions and weaknesses of the EU as the Third party can be observed. Namely, besides the aforementioned problems within the Union itself, the weakness of the EU as a Third Party in this process is also reflected in the fact that it seeks to be status-neutral in the negotiations, despite the fact that most of its members have recognized the unilaterally declared independence of the so-called Kosovo, while one smaller part of it has not. Thus, it happens that EU member states, independently, and contrary to the efforts of the joint EU bodies participating in this process, implement policies that are not in the interest of reconciliation and the establishment of lasting peace in this post-conflict region. In addition, under the pressure of its influential members who recognized the legitimacy of Kosovo, it sometimes seems that the entire process is not actually status-neutral and aimed at achieving a more sustainable solution that will secure peace in the long run, but that the Union's common institutions are used to promote Kosovo's independence, which reduces the level of confidence of Serbian negotiators in the EU as a neutral and objective mediator.

On the other hand, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, did not contribute to the process of reconciliation among the former Yugoslavian constituents and its citizens,

as originally expected. The fact that can hardly be disputed is that its existence and activity raised awareness, not only of the regional but also of the international community, that there occurred crimes in the conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia, and that the individuals who had committed them or who had been responsible for them had to be prosecuted. The individualization of guilt is certainly a good way not to transfer responsibility for crimes to the whole nation and religious communities, which as a principle undoubtedly contributes to the process of reconciliation. However, despite the unfulfilled desire of the court to ensure justice for all victims, regardless of their side in conflict, by naming and punishing all perpetrators, there are serious restrictions that do not allow The Hague Tribunal to be legitimized as the Third Party in the reconciliation process.

This limitation is not only indicated by statistical data about the disproportionate number of defendants and convictions in relation to national affiliation, but also by the impression that certain processes were guided by political influence, which led to the fact that the perpetrators or the responsible persons were not found for the proven crimes.⁵ Moreover, the way in which court proceedings were conducted at The Hague tribunal contributed to the fact that persons from the warrant were seen as national heroes, which again offended the victims and further slowed down the already difficult and slow process of reconciliation. In addition, The Hague Tribunal restrictions are also reflected in the uniformity of judicial processes, which are focused solely on the identification of crimes and criminals, including their punishment, but not on the help and support to victims. Therefore, one of the side-effects of such an approach is the maintenance and enhancement of an identity of a victim, which further favours the development of revenge and hatred (Nikolić-Ristanović & Srna, 2008).

As already mentioned, the role of the Third Party in the process of reconciliation can also be given to different non-governmental organizations, primarily those more influential, which are part of certain broader peace movements. Although their role in peace processes is valuable, it is sometimes insufficient to prevent armed conflicts or completely heal war wounds in post-conflict societies. The statement made by the political scientist Vukašin Pavlović is that the efforts of the peace movements on the ground of the former Yugoslavia to prevent or stop the war remain futile (Pavlović, 2009). The reason for the failure resulting in the bloody civil war is seen in the fact that the majority, who had been against the war, didn't succeed in resisting the well-organized efforts of all others who were willing to use the worst means to start it

⁵ See <http://www.icty.org/bcs/cases/spisak-presuda>.

(Pavlović, 2009). Unfortunately, the same war elites and profiteers do not allow the true reconciliation among the peoples of former Yugoslavia today. Under such conditions, the success of the Third Party becomes more than questionable.

FROM TRUTH TO RECONCILIATION

One of the prominent messages during the process of reconciliation in the South African Republic was that the truth would set people free. The Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Tutu, in Cohen, 2001) notes that if the truth does not come to the surface, it will haunt society as a "ghost". Therefore, the past has to be named in order to reach the future (Bloomfield et al., 2003). It is impossible to forget the past and start everything anew as if nothing had happened (Bloomfield et al., 2003). Namely, victims seek adequate punishments for criminals, in order to satisfy justice at least in part. St. Augustine believed that peace was rooted in the concepts of justice and goodness and that it stemmed from the claim for injustice to be sanctified, and for the evil to be corrected (Coker, 2010). However, it should be borne in mind that justice does not have a universal meaning and significance, but that it is a concept that depends on the cultural context. This in fact means that the way of "satisfying justice" in South Africa does not necessarily have to be a model that could "satisfy justice" in post-Yugoslav cultural space, and vice-versa.

Since the paths and effects of truth are complex, they can have healing impact only if the interpretation of truth is directed towards self-healing, reconciliation and recovery (Cohen, 2001). However, truth-related activities can also manifest themselves in a way that does not contribute to reconciliation (Kriesberg, 2004), and therefore some authors state that the act of apology must fulfil other conditions: the truthfulness of gesture, the full and unconditional acceptance of responsibility, and the avoidance of any justification for what has been done (Bloomfield et al., 2003). Accordingly, it is not enough to recognize the crime factually, but to unambiguously show embarrassment and repentance, because embarrassment is a sign that the damage done by the perpetrator has been recognized (Long & Brecke, 2003, according to Petrović, 2005).

In the process of reconciliation in South Africa, it could be said that the truth was the main element of reconciliation. Namely, it was believed that the spiritual-psychological interaction of victims and perpetrators would contribute to the closure of old relationships in a way that they would never repeat again. According to Galtung (2001), spiritual-psychological interaction is performed in four acts:

1. The perpetrator: "I apologize" (meaning "I'm sorry for what I did and I promise no more.");
2. Victim: "I accept apology" (meaning "I believe in what you said, let's continue to live on.");
3. The perpetrator: "Please forgive me" (meaning "Please release me from my guilt.");
4. Victim: "I forgive you" (meaning "I release you from guilt.").

At first glance, this "drama" seems simple. However, it hides many obstacles in itself, because whether it will come to reconciliation depends on the fact whether everyone has "played" their script, both the victim and the perpetrator (Minow, 1998). This is why this interaction is vulnerable (Galtung, 2001).

Govier (2003) believes that the perpetrator must admit to himself that he had committed the crime before the confession (telling the truth to the victim). The main obstacle to self-discovery is denial, which is not only an individual, but also a collective mechanism. Thus, denial functions not only as an unconscious defense mechanism at the level of the human psyche, but also at the social level that aims to maintain the existing social climate in which the crime is not recognized or, what is more, appears as normal and justified (Cohen, 2001). Namely, Cohen (2001) speaks about entire societies and states that use numerous methods to avoid truth: cover-up, deception, concealment, rhetoric, embellishment, etc.

Only when the perpetrator recognizes the crime, interaction can begin. However, self-confession is not enough (Cohen, 2001) because things can be made known, but not admitted (Govier, 2003). Therefore, it is necessary for the knowledge to be publicly verbalized or emphasized in some other form of consciousness (Govier, 2003). It is not enough to merely overcome one's "inner speech", but it is necessary to confess in a manner that reaches and is received and accepted by the victim (Govier, 2003). Like self-confession, admission is a painful and difficult process, which can be the reason for ignoring the crime (Govier, 2003). The inner discomfort that the perpetrator feels can also come from the concern about the way society and the local community will accept the admission of guilt. And the mentioned circumstances can compel the perpetrator to admit the crime in part, or even as a compromise⁶. An example of a compromise admission can be the presence of the then Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic at the 20th anniversary commemoration in Potocari marking the crimes in Srebrenica.

⁶ Compromised confession means that someone who confesses to a crime does that as the expression of a mixed message, which consist of both admissional and denial elements (Govier, 2001).

Therefore, it is not only important to confess, but the admission of guilt must lead to its acceptance (Govier, 2003). While the main obstacle to recognizing a crime for a perpetrator is denial, for a victim it is anger that may escalate into the desire for vengeance. Revenge is an impulse to attack (to commit a new crime) the one who had committed the crime (injustice) (Minow, 1998). Revenge undoubtedly has psychological significance for the victim, because it restores self-esteem, returns the feeling that justice was served and thus brings satisfaction (Minow, 1998). But this temporary satisfaction can have far-reaching consequences at a personal and social level. On a personal basis, the result can be futile and increase pain and suffering, while at the social level, vengeance can escalate into intergroup violence again (Minow, 1998). Therefore, it is necessary to overcome the desire and not allow the victim to become the perpetrator (Nadler, 2002, in Petrović, 2005).

After the perpetrator admits his crime, everything is in the hands of the victim (Nadler, 2002 in Petrović, 2005). The victim chooses to give or deny forgiveness (Nadler, 2002 in, 2005). Accepting an apology does not mean forgiveness. Forgiveness requires much more than an apology. Forgiveness implies a changed view of oneself, as well as of the other side of the conflict (Long & Brecke, 2003 in Petrović, 2005). Forgiveness means self-transformation in which the person does not see oneself as a victim any more and sees the perpetrator as someone with a new identity (Long & Brecke, 2003 in Petrović, 2005). Through the process of forgiveness, emotions are transformed (from anger to benevolence) and certain beliefs about the self and the other side are overcome, thereby creating the possibility for new, effective relationships (Long & Brecke, 2003 in Petrović, 2005).

The spiritual-psychological transaction was the basic model of victim and perpetrator interaction in the process of reconciliation in South Africa. However, the question arises as to whether the transaction can be "applicable" to relations between the people on the territory of former Yugoslavia, especially bearing in mind the fact that it is not clear who the victim and who the perpetrator has been. This is because perpetrators from post-Yugoslav countries are presented not only as national heroes, but also as victims who only defended themselves and their people from the aggressor. It is obvious that in this representation of the perpetrator, there are serious political manipulations of the victims, because it was understood that in that way it was easier to get some benefit, whether political or economic. For political interests, the media is used as a scene of conflict, not to promote the ideas of tolerance and understanding (Milenković, 2020). In fact, the basic problem in these kinds of manipulations lies in the fact that both aggressors and victims are hiding behind collective identities. In addition, there are major disagreements

today about the causes of the war in Yugoslavia, as well as the time period in which these causes are sought.⁷ In order for the process of reconciliation to take place at all, it is important to find and prosecute responsible individuals because there can be no justice in the war if there are no men and women to whom responsibility can be attributed (Volzer, 2010). The processes conducted at the International Court in the Hague should have contributed to the individualization of the crimes in which every criminal would have been marked by their full name, , but this did not happen. Unlike the process of recognizing the crimes in South Africa, where it was known who the individuals who committed the crimes were, the burden of crimes on the territory of former Yugoslavia was borne, or is still borne, by the ethnic communities.

There are numerous examples of denying crimes in post-Yugoslav territories, as evidenced by the political rhetoric about the Croatian military-police operation "Storm", the pogrom of the Serbs in Kosovo in 2004, the events in Srebrenica and Bratunac in 1995, etc. In this context, the important question is whether recognition and repentance are expected only from arrested and convicted war criminals or from those who call themselves heroes today? In any case, the problem of "proven" and celebrated national heroes admitting to a crime without getting amnesty, but a punishment for that confession, remains. Can one hope for repentance, if there is no place for recognition in this post-Yugoslav process of reconciliation? Obviously not. Given that national identity is built on their "heroic deeds," it actually means that if they ceased to be "heroes", the whole system of values that had been built upon those values would start to collapse. Therefore, if the perpetrators wanted to admit their guilt, the war elites would not allow them to, because they still have a strong social impact. If there is no confession, there is no repentance, so there is no forgiveness. This, in fact, means that one can hardly come from truth to reconciliation in the post-Yugoslav space.

CONCLUSION

It is clear to everyone that the process of reconciliation in post-Yugoslav space is followed by numerous difficulties and, in addition to being tediously long and without any clear indication of when it would end, its final outcome is uncertain. In order to achieve the general

⁷ Recalling the events from the beginning of the 19th century, General Ratko Mladic in the statement on the occasion of the taking of Srebrenica just confirms that temporal confusion. "Here we are on 11th July, 1995, in the Serbian Srebrenica. On the eve of another great Serbian holiday, we give this city to the Serbian people. It's time that, after rebellion against dahia, we took revenge on the Turks in this area." See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=edFQTZpf8yM>.

progress of all social communities living in this area, it is necessary not only to persevere in this process, but also to seek new models that will have a greater chance of success. For the reconciliation in and among the countries of former Yugoslavia, the model of reconciliation in the South African Republic, developed after the apartheid period, serves as a starting point. Analyzing the events and mechanisms that were developed during the 1990s in the South African reconciliation process, three basic principles (ideas) on which the model was resting could be observed, which, in the context of possible application to the process of reconciliation in post-Yugoslav space, are discussed in greater detail.

The first principle is based on the assumption that the success of reconciliation is conditioned by the movement of the process itself from a higher, elitist level, to "ordinary people". The current political situation in the countries of former Yugoslavia, as well as the role of political subjects in the post-conflict period, has proven to be insufficiently effective in the process of reconciliation. Therefore, in accordance with the model of reconciliation in South Africa, the idea is to bring down reconciliation to the level of the local community and allow ordinary people to participate in the creation of social life in that community. Of course, for such an undertaking, several important prerequisites must be fulfilled. The first is that there is an agreement by the state power to bring the process of reconciliation down to "ordinary people", and the second, that "ordinary people" are really interested in actively participating in that process, not waiting for the state and political elites to give ready-made solutions with instructions on how to apply them.

This actually means that political elites and other powerful social subjects, both nationally and internationally, must "disarm" themselves from their political and other interests (intentions) that do not lead and do not aim at reconciliation. The proof that the top of the political authority is undermining the process of reconciliation can be perceived in the general attitude of the respondents, in the recently conducted research, who believe that the state aggravates reconciliation processes in order to protect particular interests (Adamović et al., 2017). In addition, the research also shows that the citizens' lack of interest in politics is seen as an obstacle to reconciliation. How could one expect "ordinary people" to be the bearers of this process if the layer of society which should be the main initiator of progressive social trends shows apoliticism and apathy? De Tocqueville (2002), at the time, warned us of the importance of the problem of apolitical and apathetical citizens, and saw it as a greater danger than despotism and anarchy as the two extreme forms of rule. Therefore, these phenomena should be understood very seriously and thoroughly in order to work on their overcoming institutionally.

The second principle is based on the fact that it is not enough to return reconciliation to "ordinary people", but rather that it is a process

that needs to be managed. Therefore, it is necessary to have a political body that will actively and impartially work on the process of reconciliation and that will therefore have the role of the Third party in the process. Active participation of the Third party involves constant presence and reaction to events and statements of the parties in the process that should lead to reconciliation. In South Africa, the Commission had the role of the Third Party. In the post-Yugoslav space, several actors of international character and significance have taken their chances playing the role. Namely, the Third Party's impartiality is a mandatory assumption that has often been missed by favoring a particular community to the other. Sometimes this was done with intent, and sometimes it was caused by the absence of the Third Party's reaction to certain inappropriate statements and actions taken by one of the parties in the process. An obvious example of the Third Party's passive attitude was apparent in the attitude of the international community and the EU towards the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, which was particularly noticeable when the Kosovo government introduced additional taxes for the import of products from central Serbia. Therefore, the passive role of the EU as the mediator in the talks between Belgrade and Pristina cannot contribute to reconciliation.

The third principle is based on the view that reconciliation can only come with truth. However, it is important that this truth is not only presented as factual information, but rather expressed in a way that reflects the apologetic attitude. Previous practice in the territory of former Yugoslavia, which was predominantly reduced to mutual accusations for crimes, obviously did not give any results, and therefore it was necessary to seek new solutions. There was no real and comprehensive truth about the events and crimes committed on the post-Yugoslav territory, nor in the processes conducted before the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in The Hague. This suggests that this process must be carried out at the political level, i.e. assuming responsibility, admission of guilt, and the apology for crimes should be taken over by political representatives. Given that the crime and victims were on all sides in the conflict, the apology must be mutually agreed upon, or pronounced by representatives of all states, ethnicities and religious communities in the region. Otherwise, if this process is one-sided, with the apology of only one community, there may be a new imbalance in the relationship, in which the roles of "aggressors" and "victims" will again be highlighted and strengthened.

In the end, the analysis of all three principles on which the process of reconciliation in the post-Yugoslav space should be based, and which were modelled on the reconciliation model in South Africa, as well as the problems and constraints that accompany this process, point to the conclusion that none of these principles, and therefore the process of

reconciliation itself, cannot be implemented without clear political will. Therefore, political will is *conditio sine qua non* for reconciliation.

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ПОМИРЕЊЕ У ЈУЖНОАФРИЧКОЈ РЕПУБЛИЦИ КАО (НЕ)МОГУЋИ МОДЕЛ ПОМИРЕЊА НА ПОСТЈУГОСЛОВЕНСКОМ ПРОСТОРУ

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Резиме

Дуго времена требало је да се схвати да обустава рата и потписивање примирја не значи нужно стварање дуготрајног и стабилног мира. Стога је почетком деведесетих година прошлог века формулисан концепт помирења, када су започете и прве студије о помирењу. Посебну заслугу за развој концепта помирења сигурно имају и догађаји у Јужноафричкој републици након периода апартхејда. С тим у вези, у овом раду разматране су основне идеје модела помирења у Јужноафричкој републици и могућности њихове примене између етничких заједница и бивших зараћених страна на подручју бивше Југославије.

Пошто је модел помирења у Јужноафричкој републици по својој природи комплексан, те се стога не може разматрати у целини, екстраховано је само неколико кључних идеја и то: да је за процес помирења важан контакт „обичног света“, да је за помирење неопходна нека Трећа страна која ће управљати процесом помирења, и да је истина незаобилазан фактор помирења.

Идеја да је важан однос (контакт) између самих грађана локалне заједнице заснована је на идеји да би партиципација „обичног света“ у процесу помирења подстакла укључивање и инспирисање што већег броја људи који би осетили сопствену одговорност и важност. Међутим, није довољно само вратити помирење међу „обичан свет“, већ је потребно да наведеним процесом управља нека Трећа страна, слично улози коју је имала Комисија за истину и помирење у Јужноафричкој републици. И на крају, говорење истине и признавање кривице о

почињеним злочинима у којима треба да учествују све бивше зараћене стране, је незаоставни и незаобилазни пут до помирења и на простору бивше Југославије.

Анализа сва три принципа (идеја) на којима би процес помирења на пост-југословенском простору требало да се заснива, а који су рађени по узору на модел помирења у Јужноафричкој републици, као и проблема и ограничења који прате тај процес, упућују на закључак да ни један од тих принципа, па самим тим ни процес помирења, није могуће спровести без јасне политичке воље. Дакле, политичка воља је *conditio sine qua non*, и она не мора нужно да се огледа у активном деловању влада, већ је довољно да постоји прећутна сагласност и одсуство потеза власти инспирисаних деструктивним национализмом, што би дало довољно простора другим друштвеним актерима да се процес помирења успешно приведе крају, посебно „обичном свету“ у локалној заједници.