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ANGLO-SAXON HISTORIOGRAPHY ABOUT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GREAT WAR[a]

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Abstract

This paper presents the views of leading representatives of contemporary Anglo-Saxon historiography regarding Serbia's responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War. Over the past several years, as the celebration of the centenary of the outbreak of the Great War approached, a part of Anglo-Saxon historiography re-opened the question of responsibility for its outbreak. Without engaging in objective analysis of the most relevant historical facts and archive documents, certain representatives of Anglo-Saxon historiography have put forward claims that Serbia and the Serbian government were responsible for the First World War and its outbreak. At the same time, they clear Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary of all guilt. The most distinguished representatives of this school of historiography are the British historians Margaret MacMillan, Christopher Clark, as well as Sean McMeekin. They all believe that Serbian authorities instigated, organized and materially supported members of the Young Bosnia movement to assassinate the Austrian Heir Presumptive, Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Key words: Anglo-Saxon historiography, Young Bosnia, responsibility, First World War, Serbia.

АНГЛОСАКСОНСКА ИСТОРИОГРАФИЈА О ОДГОВОРНОСТИ ЗА ПРВИ СВЕТСКИ РАТ

Апстракт

У овом раду се износе гледишта најзначајнијих представника савремене англосаксонске историографије о одговорности Србије за избијање Првог светског рата. Последњих неколико година како се приближавало обележавање сто година од почетка Великог рата у делу англосаксонске исотриографије је поново отворено питање одговорности за његово почетак. Без објективног сагледа-

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вања најрелевантнијих историјских чињеница и архивске грађе, поједини представници англосасконске историографије тврде да је за Први светски рат и његов почетак одговорна Србија и српска влада. Они истовремено од одговорности амнестирају Немачку и њену савезницу Аустроугарску. Најзначајнији представници такве историографске струје су: британски историчари Маргарет Макмилан, Кристофер Кларк, али и Шон Мекмекин. Сви они сматрају да су српске власти подстакле, организовале и материјално помогле представнике организације Млада Босна да изврше атентат на аустријског престолонаследника надвојводу Франца Фердинанда.

Кључне речи: Англосаксонска историографија, Млада Босна, одговорност, Први светски рат, Србија

INTRODUCTION

On the eve of the centenary of the outbreak of the Great War, Anglo-Saxon historians reopened the question of revision of responsibility for its outbreak, assigning guilt to Serbia while at the same time absolving Austria-Hungary and Germany of any responsibility. This is a forced contortion of historical facts. The revision of the responsibility for the Great War has been ongoing practically from 1914 onwards, becoming topical almost invariably at times of great crises, particularly during the 1920s and 1930s, or at the time of commemorating some of the major anniversaries of the Great War. Alongside placing the blame on Nikola Pašić and the Serbian Government, the latest proponents of historical revision have also put forward theses that Gavrilo Princip was a terrorist and Young Bosnia a terrorist organization of Serbian nationalists from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Over the past several years, the main advocates of the revisionist approach in Anglo-Saxon historiography have included Dennis Hupchick, Mark Cornwall, writer of chapters in the 2010 ***Companion to World War 1,*** Timothy Snyder, Christopher Clark, Margaret MacMillan, and Sean McMeekin. This paper analyses the views of Hupchick, Christopher Clark, Margaret MacMillan, and Sean McMeekin. It should be noted that Mark Cornwall claimed that by late July 1914 Nikola Pašić knew that if Greater Serbia materialized, it would be out of the fires of a full European war, and that Serbia itself had helped to create this war because during the July Crisis it was not prepared to return to the status of an Austro-Hungarian satellite (Bjelajac, 2014, p. 175). Fortunately, there are also such highly professional historians who, based on diplomatic materials and historical sources, refute the thesis on the Serbian responsibility for the start of the First World War. Among them is Jean-Jacques Becker, French historian and Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanteree, who in his book ***L'Année 14*** (first edition published in 2004) argued that the Serbian Government bore no responsibility at all for the Sarajevo assassination (Becker, 2013, pp. 48−49).

The first charges that Serbia and the Serbian people caused the outbreak of the global war were put forward by Mary Durham in mid-December 1914 in her correspondence with George Bernard Shaw. She carried on her anti-Serbian campaign with even greater force after the Great War ended. Responding to the heavy charges, Professor Seton-Watson launched a scientific war of sorts in 1920 with Durham, which would continue over the next several years, refuting her theses on Serbia's responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Mary Durham would voice her Serbophobia and accusations in her book ***The Sarajevo Crime***, which was published in London in 1925. In her opinion, there was a connection between Franz Ferdinand's assassins, members of Young Bosnia, with the Serbian Government through its officials Milan Ciganović, Voja Tankosić, and Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis, Chief of the Serbian General Staff Intelligence Service, who encouraged members of Young Bosnia to commit the assassination. She believed Austria was right to accuse Dimitrijević, Tankosić, and Ciganović of participating in the crime. According to Durham, the responsibility of the Serbian Government is irrefutable as it did not arrest Dimitrijević and Tankosić, and allowed Ciganović to flee and be spared punishment for the crime.

CONTEMPORARY REVISIONS OF THE RESPOSIBILITY FOR THE FIRST WORLD WAR

In American historiography, the process of historical revision was started by Harry Elmer Barnes, Professor of Cultural History and Sociology at the Smith College, University of Massachusetts, in his 1927 book ***The Genesis of the World War***. Also active in efforts to absolve Germany from war responsibility were Professors Michael Hermond Cohran from the Missouri University, John Franklin Jameson, editor of the American Historical Review, and Ferdinand Schevill from the University of Chicago.

Today's counterfeiters of historical facts belonging to Anglo-Saxon historiography are also spreading a whole array of inaccuracies. Their key problem is methodological in nature, as they interpret the past from the viewpoint of the present day, thereby engaging in inadmissible modernization of history. Based on their projection, Gavrilo Princip was the idea guru of Osama Bin Laden, while Young Bosnia was a precursor to Al-Qaeda as a dangerous militant terrorist organization.

In 2002, Dennis Hupchick, professor of history at Wilkes University in Pennsylvania, published a book entitled ***The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism*** which swarms with all sorts of prejudice against Serbs and Young Bosnia, and in which he highlights the responsibility of, as he terms it, Serbian nation-state nationalism for the outbreak of the First World War (Hupchick, 2002, p. 280).

According to Hupchick, Serbian nationalists were irated by Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908. In response, King Petar Karađorđević and his government decided to remove Austrian presence from Bosnia and secure Serbian control over this region. He characterised Young Bosnia as an amorphous nationalist association that sought independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Habsburg rule and creation of a Serb-led Yugoslav state. Its members disagreed over tactics, but had a general affinity for radical measures, in order to finally embrace terrorism which the Young Bosnians elevated to a cult. Hupchick further says that from 1912 onwards members of Young Bosnia were in direct contact with the Black Hand organization, which engineered terrorist activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The American historian also analyses the attitude of Young Bosnians towards the Austrian Heir Presumptive who, to them, represented a personification of the Austrian threat to pro-Serbian and Yugoslav national aspirations (Hupchick, 2002, pp. 317−318).

With regard to responsibility for the Sarajevo assassination, Hupchick says that conspirators' weapons came from the Serbian state arsenal and were issued to assassins by Black Hand operatives. Interestingly, he grants that Pašić was informed of the conspiracy and of Black Hand's dealings with Young Bosnians. Fearing a possible war with Austria-Hungary, Pašić tried to notify the Habsburg authorities of the possible assassination through Serbia's ambassador in Vienna (Hupchick, 2002, p. 318).

In his study ***The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914,*** which was first published in 2012, Christopher Clark, professor of history at the University of Cambridge, put forward perhaps the largest number of charges against Serbia regarding its complicity and responsibility for the Great War. Unfortunately, this qualified him to receive very favourable reviews from several leading British historiographers, including Robert Evans, professor of modern history at Oxford and writer of the famous book ***The Coming of the First World War***, and Richard Evans, professor of modern history at Cambridge. This book was translated into German and French, and was named book of the year in Germany. Also, Clark was awarded the Officer's Cross of the Order of Merit by the German government for his efforts.

According to Clark, Germany bears practically no responsibility for the First World War and Germans were not the only imperialists. "The First World War was the Third Balkan War before it became the First World War", says Clark. He says that Serbian government officials were connected with "terrorist organizations" "aiming to realize the Greater Serbian ideal", that Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis was the key figure and the principal architect behind the plot to assassinate Franz Ferdinand, while, according to Clark, the idea of assassination itself probably originated from Apis's friend Rade Malobabić (Clark, 2014, p. 42). Among the persons selected to commit the assassination, Clark lists Voja Tankosić

and members of Young Bosnia, Trifko Grabež, Nedeljko Čabrinović, and Gavrilo Princip, all of whom were imbued with irredentist ideas and national poetry, but were in particular obsessed with the idea of sacrifice. According to him, an avowedly terrorist organization with a cult of sacrifice, death, and revenge was behind the assassination in Sarajevo (Clark, 2014, pp. 43−44).

Clark considers in detail the question of how much Pašić knew about the assassination, pointing out that he was apprised of the plan in some detail, as well as that he was informed not only about the assassination, but also about the persons and organizations behind the plot by Milan Ciganović, who was his personal agent (Clark, 2014, pp. 48−49). And while he grants that Pašić wanted peace, he holds that the Serbian Prime Minister believed that the final historical stage of Serbian expansion could not be achieved without a war. According to Clark, on a subconscious level, Pašić desired war to break out as soon as possible in order to round off the Serbian national project (Clark, 2014, p. 53).

In her study ***"The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914"*** published in 2013, Margaret MacMillan, professor of history at Oxford University, engaged in major modernization of history by positing that Gavrilo Princip was the equivalent of modern-day terrorists, and Young Bosnia the precursor to Al-Qaeda. According to her, members of Young Bosnia were fanatics, incapable of any sort of compromise, in an unsettling parallel to modern-day terrorists and Al-Qaeda. She finds points of similarity between Young Bosnians and Al-Qaeda in their puritanism which, among other things, involved abstinence from alcohol. According to Margaret MacMillan, members of Young Bosnia were idealistic and honestly committed to liberating Bosnia and Herzegovina from Austrian rule and to building a fairer world. They were strongly influenced by Russian revolutionaries and anarchists, which led them to believe that their goals could only be achieved through violence and the sacrifice of their own lives (MacMillan, 2013, p. 547).

She characterizes Gavrilo Princip as a terrorist and leader of the plot to assassinate the Austrian Archduke. Finally, she concludes that Serbia was largely complicit in the Sarajevo assassination, highlighting that there was considerable support for Young Bosnians within Serbia itself. According to MacMillan, Serbia was probably aware of the planned assassination, but it stood up to Austria during the July Crisis because it was backed by Russia (MacMillan, 2013, p. 545).

Sean McMeekin is an American historian. He was educated at Stanford and UC Berkley, where he took his doctoral degree. He is an expert in modern 20th century history, and has specialized in the history of the First World War. He teaches at the College of Social Studies and Humanities of the Koç University of Istanbul, where he teaches courses in modern German and Russian history, History of the Great War, and

Communism. He has published several notable studies, including, in particular: ***History's Greatest Heist. The Looting of Russia by Bolsheviks***, ***The Berlin-Baghdad Express. The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power***. His book that caused a great stir among scholars and the general public was entitled ***The Russian Origins of the First World War,*** and was published by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, in 2011.

By contrast to his Anglo-Saxon colleagues, Clark and Margaret MacMillan, who saw Serbia as the main instigator and cause of the Great War, McMeekin apportions key blame for the outbreak of the First World War to imperial Russia. He figuratively says that the key to the outbreak of the war lay in St. Petersburg, and not Berlin. In his book, he develops the basic thesis that Russian imperial aspirations played a key part in causing the First World War, as Russia's overriding and long-standing goal for over a hundred years had been to achieve control over Constantinople and the Straits, which could only be done through dismantling the Ottoman Empire and taking over control of the Bosporus. For hundreds of years, Russia had used every opportunity to achieve this goal. In the book, he advocates the view that Russia was the key culprit for the outbreak of the Great War, and places particular emphasis on the negative role of Russian statesmen in the Great War, including in particular Sergey Sazonov, Russia's Foreign Minister.

McMeekin points out that as early as in the second half of the 19th century, Great Britain and Austria had blocked Russia's attempts to enhance its influence in Turkey, while on the other hand Germany used this situation to strengthen its position. Germans trained and armed the Ottoman army, while Great Britain modernized the Ottoman navy.

Referring to the imperialistic appetites of the imperial Russia, he points out that by contrast to Germany, which aimed to dominate "Mitteleuropa" and "Mittelafrica", along with Asiatic Turkey, Russian imperialistic goals were directed primarily at the Far East. Since the Russo-Japanese War, St. Petersburg worked to strengthen its position in the East, with Japanese recognition of Russian supremacy in northern Manchuria in 1912, and China granting autonomy to Mongolia under Russian pressure in the same year. London agreed to cede to Russia a zone of influence north of the Hindu Kush region in Afghanistan in 1914. In the meantime, Russia's imperial penetration of northern Persia led to the acquisition of three-quarters of the so-called "Persian Azerbaijan" inhabited mostly by Muslims. The Armenian reform campaign of 1913-1914 alarmed both the Porte and Berlin, as it represented an attempt to expand Russian influence to Turkish Anatolia. The long-standing Russian plan to seize Constantinople was very topical in Russian political circles, even though the Black Sea fleet was still not strong enough to carry out that task in 1914.

The author links Russia's entry into war on behalf of Serbia with the possibility that Polish nationalists may rise up against Russian rule

under the influence of Pan-Slavists. Here, McMeekin voices old clichés that Russians had embraced the ideology of Pan-Slavism in order to achieve their imperialistic goals in the Mediterranean.

McMeekin pays particular attention to the question of the July Crisis, pointing out that Germany bears no responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War. He believes Russia and its allies made a number of decisions they knew would make a general European war inevitable. For instance, just days before the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, French President Raymond Poincaré visited Russia in order to learn of Russia's position with regard to the new situation created by the Sarajevo assassination. McMeekin notes there is little record of the discussions during the visit, but points to the fact that in the aftermath of the visit both Russian and French diplomats expressed resolve to support Serbia in the event of an Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.

According to McMeekin, yet another indicator of Russia's responsibility for the outbreak of the war is to be found in Russia's decision to mobilize its troops in late July 1914, signalling direct support to Serbia against Austria, to which Sazonov confessed in his memoirs. He also refers to a meeting in November 1912 at which Russia formulated its policy during the First Balkan War, when it was established that even limited mobilization of troops against Austria could not but lead to a general war (McMeekin, 2011, p. 56). He further claims that Russia's partial mobilization was preceded by "a period preparatory to war", which was essentially a period of diplomatic complications preceding the opening of hostilities.

Unusually for an academic historian, McMeekin puts forward a slate of accusations against Minister Sergey Sazonov whom he characterizes as a "warmonger" (McMeekin, 2011, p. 56). Claiming that Sazonov was a "mirror image" of the German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, he describes him as a manipulative schemer who "deliberately plunged Europe into war to expand Russia's Empire". According to him, the Russian Foreign Minister knew in the summer of 1914 that "he was risking war and was sympathetic to Russian imperial aims". In the closing of the book, however, he somewhat moderates his harsh judgement of Russia present almost from the first page by saying that "there were at least as many men in St. Petersburg who wanted war in 1914 as there were in Berlin – and the men in Petersburg mobilized first" (McMeekin, 2011, p. 259).

INDISPUTABLE FACTS ABOUT THE FIRST WORLD WAR

This and similar studies accusing Russia and Serbia of instigating the First World War cannot obliterate indisputable historical facts that were long ago established by the historical science. Austria-Hungary had prepared for war against Serbia for many years before the Sarajevo assassination. It decided to remove Serbia as a potential obstacle to Austria's Balkans policy

as early as in 1907-1908, resurrecting this idea with each new crisis in the Balkans (Mitrović, 1988, p. 428). According to academician Andrej Mitrović, there were three scenarios for removing or destroying Serbia as a threat to Austrian plans in the Balkans. The first entailed a division of Serbia between Austria and Bulgaria, i.e. among Austria, Bulgaria, and Romania. The second envisaged a shrinking of its territory through cessation of its parts to Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania at a later time. The remains of the Serbian state would then be unable to function independently, and would therefore have to rely on Austria's help and support. The third option meant drawing Serbia within Austria's borders or its sphere of interest (Mitrović, 1981, p. 429).

As early as in 1906, Chief of Austrian General Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, the most bellicose representative of the Austrian military and state elite, advocated the destruction of Serbia, which he saw as a threat to Austria's strategic goals in the Balkans, and a "permanent hearth" of aspirations and machinations (Terzić, 2003, p. 318). In a letter to Lexa Aerenthal of 18 December 1907, he gave a clear outline of his views regarding the future of Serbia, pointing out that already during the 1878 occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina it had become clear to him that the "resolution of the Yugoslav issue lies in Serbia alone, that is, in a sweeping action with the overarching goal of annexing Serbia" (Ćorović, 1992, p. 207).

On the eve of annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austrian diplomatic circles affirmed Vienna would not be able to ensure the safety of its south borders "unless we decide to uproot this evil and put an end to the dreams of a pan-Serbian future" (Ćorović, 1992, p. 143). On 5 September 1908, in conversation with Baron Wilhelm von Schoen, German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lexa Aerenthal reiterated his long-standing view of Serbia, saying that he "intends to annihilate the Serbian revolutionary nest" and that he is ready to cede Serbia to Bulgaria, "which would produce an important benefit for Austria-Hungary of having a state with a defined ethnographic border as its neighbour" (Ćorović, 1992, p. 144). In effect, the plan of the highest state, diplomatic, and military circles of Austria-Hungary was for Serbia to be pitted against its neighbours − Montenegro, Albania, and Bulgaria, then isolated, represented as a revolutionary centre, and discredited before Europe, all of which would then help justify any rigorous measures taken against it that, in the final instance, would result in the disappearance of an independent Serbia (Ćorović, 1992, p. 145).

Immediately after the Austrian Heir Presumptive and his wife were murdered, the highest political circles in Austria started accusing Serbia of the assassination. For instance, Count Alexander Hoyos, chief of cabinet of Leopold Berchtold, Foreign Affairs Minister, accused the Serbian Government of Franz Ferdinand's murder saying that "even if it did not instigate it, the assassination was committed under its tolerant eye"

(Ćorović, 1992, p. 666). Baron Stork, Charge d'Affairs of the Austrian Embassy in Belgrade, was even more explicit. He claimed that "pan-Serb propaganda nourished under the aegis of the Government and the agitation which for so many years has been carried out in the press, are the true culprits for this catastrophe [...] The cult of Obilić as a national hero from Kosovo who, with his two companions, stabbed emperor Murad is likely to have served as a model to Sarajevo assassins as well, inculcated with the ideas of pan-Serb agitation. Moreover, indirect blame for the assassination also lies with Serbian university professors and the Propaganda Department of the Serbian Foreign Affairs Ministry" (Ćorović, 1992, p. 666). Further, Oskar Potiorek, Head of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government, noted in the wake of the assassination that the "true causes of the accident, which may well be only a herald of future unrest, are to be looked for in Serbia" (Ćorović, 1992, p. 666).

After the Sarajevo assassination, Germany encouraged Vienna to take harsh measures against Serbia. The German Emperor Wilhelm II also believed that it was high time for a settling of scores with the Serbs. His sentence is famous: "Serbs must be dealt with and quickly. Everything is understood of itself and as clear as day" (Ćorović, 1992, p. 670). The conflict with Serbia was only to serve as a pretext for a final settling of scores between Germany, and Russia and France, i.e. for the outbreak of a great war (Radojević, Dimić, 2014, p. 85). Berlin believed Russia was not ready for war and would need several years to arm its forces. Such an opportunity was not to be missed.

Moreover, McMeekin either forgets or is deliberately silent with regard to the so-called September Programme of the German Government of 1914, which is illustrative of Germany's true intentions that were very ambitious. This was supposed to be a lightning-speed war that would end with quick victories. The plan involved great territorial enlargements in Western and Eastern Europe, major colonial conquests and large economic demands on defeated countries. In all these plans, the Balkans and Serbia played a key role. The Serbian state was supposed to shrink territorially and come indirectly under the German sphere of influence (Mitrović, 1981, p. 433).

He also overlooks some long-established historical truths. As early as in the 1960s, the German historian Fritz Fischer gave a clear judgment regarding German guilt for the outbreak of the Great War in his capital study ***Seizing World Power. Germany's Aims in the First World War 1914-1918***. Professor Fischer pointed out that the German Keiser Wilhelm II was ready for a war, which he saw as an "imminent struggle for existence which the Germanic peoples will have to fight out against the Slavs", because he believed in racial differences between Russo-Gauls and Germans; thereby, Fischer undid the myth prevailing in German historiography to that date that Germany had waged a defensive war, i.e. a war that had been

imposed upon them (Fischer, 2014, p. 27). Fischer also claimed that German leadership must bear a substantial share of responsibility for the outbreak of general war as Germany willed the Austro-Serbian conflict and, in its confidence in its own superiority, deliberately faced the risk of a conflict with France and Russia (Fischer, 2014, p. 72).

Dominique Lieven, professor of Russian history at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences, advocated a similar view in his 1983 study ***Russia and the Origins of the First World War***, when he established that analysis of the July Crisis from the Russian standpoint confirmed the accepted view that the main and direct responsibility for the outbreak of the war lay indisputably with the German government.

Regardless of whether they personally believe in what they are writing or are only voicing someone else's opinions, the views of Anglo-Saxon historians regarding Serbia's responsibility for the world war and their simplified interpretation of Gavrilo Princip and Young Bosnia, as presented in their papers and public appearances, represent a paradigm of prejudice, are not grounded in historical facts, and cannot be held up as an example of objectiveness. Instead, these papers are a contribution to a tendentious revision of historical facts.

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АНГЛОСАКСОНСКА ИСТОРИОГРАФИЈА О ОДГОВОРНОСТИ ЗА ПРВИ СВЕТСКИ РАТ

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Резиме

Први светски рат или Велики рат како је незванични назив за највећи ратни сукоб у историји човечанства произвео је катастрофалне људске и материјалне жртве које се процењују на петнаест милиона погинулих и 340 милијарди златних франака ратне штете. Већ у току ратних сукоба децембра 1914. године јавили су се у Великој Британији представници јавног мњења који су тврдили да је за почетак рата одговорна Србија, њена влада и Никола Пашић, председник владе. Такву тезу је заступала Мери Дарам, чувена антрополошкиња и добар познавалац балканске стварности. Она је током читавог рата, али и после његовог завршетка оптуживала званичну Србију да је изазвала општи рат. Због тога је дошла у сукоб са професор Ситоном Вотсоном једним од напознатијих британских историчара прве половине двадесетог века. Они су десет година водила оштру научну полемику о том питању. Последњих неколико година како се приближавало обележавање сто година од почетка Великог рата у англосаксонској историографији се појавила група историчара који покушавају да изврше ревизију историје односно да поново оптуже Србију да је изазвала Први светски рат. Истовремено они амнестирају од одговорности Немачку и Аустроугарску. На тај начин покушавају да сруше основне постулате критичке историографије Великог рата које је поставио немачки професор Фриц Фишер који је још 1961. године тврдио на основу немачке и аустријске архивске грађе да Немачка није водила одбрамбени рат 1914. године односно да немачка влада и цар Вилхелм II сносе одговорност за избијање Првог светског рата.

Најзначајнији представници тог ревизионистичког правца у англосаксонској историографији су Денис Хапчик, Маргарет Макмилан, Кристофер Кларк, Син Мекмекин. Поред стављања кривице на Србију они врше и недопустиво осавремењавање прошлости и тврде да је Гаврило Принцип претеча Осаме Бин Ладена, а Млада Босна оновремена Ал Каида. Осим тога они врше и селекцију извора и литературе тако што користе само оне студије и докумената који потврђују њихове тезе о одговорности Србије за почетак рата. По њима српска влада је осмислила атентат и дала материјалну подршку члановима Младе Босне да убију Франца Фердинанда.