MAKING WITTGENSTEIN AN EXPRESSIVIST: A CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION OF LATER WITTGENSTEIN AND SOME OF ITS CONSEQUENCES

Nikola Jandrić

DOI Number
https://doi.org/10.22190/TEME230928031J
First page
547
Last page
561

Abstract


The paper argues in favour of a novel interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations by making its consequences explicit. The aforementioned novel interpretation offers us a new way of understanding Wittgenstein as an expressivist, and as claiming that a particular form of rationality is central to philosophy. The expressivist interpretation of later Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations provides us with tools to, in a way, unite all of the most plausible parts of the strongest disparate contemporary interpretations of the said primary text: the newest and, it seems, the currently most fashionable resolute reading and the realism/antirealism debate stemming from Kripke’s famous Kripkenstein reading. The expressivist reading, thus, offers a way of explaining the therapeutic aspect of Wittgeinstein, maintaining the continuity between earlier and later Wittgeinstein, while also explaining what was so wrong about the project of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.


Keywords

Wittgeinstein, rules, expressivism, meaning, pragmatism.

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.22190/TEME230928031J

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