MONETARY DISPUTES, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, AND SOCIAL POPULISM

Marko Dimitrijević

DOI Number
https://doi.org/10.22190/TEME230204033D
First page
577
Last page
596

Abstract


The subject of analysis in this paper is the identification and analysis of the connection between monetary disputes in which the European Central Bank (ECB) is a participant, and the consequences of negative social populism, which, in practice, can affect the correct understanding of the responsibility and position of the ECB in the concept of monetary management in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The first part of the paper points to the concept and nature of monetary disputes as a new category of administrative disputes in EU monetary law, as their main features and legal addressees in practice, while the further text examines the advantages and disadvantages of judicial and arbitral settlement of monetary disputes, and discusses the potential legal basis of arbitration settlement in European monetary legislation. The subject of special attention is the monetary legal analysis of ongoing disputes and lawsuits initiated against the highest European monetary institution and their echo (understanding) in the general public. Transparent determination of regulatory competence within the existing organisational structure of the ECB, according to the author, is a conditio sine qua non of avoiding the initiation of (un)necessary monetary disputes, but also managing existing ones in a manner that is legally predictable and regulated.


Keywords

European Central Bank, monetary law, monetary stability, monetary disputes, social populism.

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.22190/TEME230204033D

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